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ABSTRACT 
 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 
Köktürk, Nur Seda 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Pınar İpek 
 
September 2010 
 
 With the internationalization of anticompetitive business activity, national 
competition laws and policies proved to be insufficient to protect competition in free 
markets. To cope with the problems created by international anticompetitive conduct, 
states and/or national regulators started to take part in various arrangements 
concerning the issue. Today, there are different forms of internationalization of 
competition law and policy such as extraterritorial application of domestic laws and 
policies and certain cooperation and convergence mechanisms. Moreover, various 
actors take part in the process: states, regulators, international organizations, firms 
etc.  
This thesis aims to analyze the important factors of internationalization of 
competition law and policy so that the reasons behind the current state of the 
internationalization process can be understood. Furthermore, four main International 
Political Economy theoretical perspectives are utilized to provide a new insight for 
and a further understanding of internationalization of competition law and policy. 
 
Keywords: Competition Law and Policy, Internationalization, European Union, 
International Organizations, International Political Economy, Realism, Liberalism, 
Historical Structuralism, Constructivism                    
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ÖZET 
 
REKABET HUKUKU VE POLİTİKASININ ULUSLARARASILAŞMASI 
Köktürk, Nur Seda 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Pınar İpek 
 
Eylül 2010 
 
  Rekabete aykırı firma eylemlerinin uluslararasılaşması ile, ulusal rekabet 
hukuku ve politikalarının serbest piyasa rekabetini korumak için yetersiz kaldığı 
anlaşılmıştır. Uluslararası rekabet karşıtı davranışların yarattığı problemler ile başa 
çıkabilmek amacıyla, ülkeler ve/veya ulusal düzenleyiciler konu ile ilgili çeşitli 
düzenlemeler içerisinde yer almaya başlamışlardır. Günümüzde rekabet hukuku ve 
politikası, ulusal rekabet hukuku ve politikalarının ülke dışı uygulanması ve bazı 
işbirliği ve yakınsama mekanizmaları gibi farklı formlarda uluslararasılaşmaktadır. 
Ayrıca bu süreçte ülkeler, düzenleyiciler, uluslararası organizasyonlar, firmalar vb. 
gibi muhtelif oyuncular da yer almaktadır. 
 Bu çalışma, rekabet hukuku ve politikasının uluslararasılaşmasında etkili olan 
faktörleri analiz etmeyi ve böylece uluslararasılaşma sürecinin şu anki durumuna 
gelmesinin sebeplerini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunun yanında, çalışmada, dört 
temel Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi teorik perspektifi kullanılarak, rekabet hukuku ve 
politikasının uluslararasılaşması konusuna yeni bir bakış açısı getirilmesi ve sürecin 
daha iyi bir şekilde anlaşılması amaçlanmaktadır.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rekabet hukuku ve politikası, Uluslararasılaşma, Avrupa Birliği, 
Uluslararası Organizasyonlar, Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi, Realizm, Liberalizm, 
Tarihsel Yapısalcılık, Konstrüktivizm 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to neoclassical economic theory/neoliberal ideology, effective 
competition in the market delivers efficiency, lowers prices, increases innovation and 
thus, brings considerable benefits to the society. There is a belief in free market 
economy because; competition in the market is thought to allocate resources between 
competing parties and hence, provide economic efficiency by this way. Therefore, in 
neoclassical thinking, there is a presumption that “the more competitive a market, the 
more efficient that market will be” (Taylor, 2006: 15).  
Nevertheless, markets do not operate perfectly; and there exists so-called 
“market failures” or “market imperfections” preventing effective and/or perfect 
competition in market. Government intervention in free markets to regulate imperfect 
competition is seen as a solution to the problem so that economic efficiency and 
welfare can increase. Thus, competition law and policy (CLP or antitrust law and 
policy) is the tool of governments to regulate market failures. Objective of CLP is to 
promote and maintain competition in the market to increase efficiency and economic 
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welfare. To achieve this objective, governments/regulators intervene in markets 
when market players engage in anticompetitive practices.  
CLP, traditionally, has been an instrument for governments to intervene in 
markets to regulate imperfections in their territorial markets. In other words, nation 
states owe the competence for regulating anticompetitive activities inside national 
boundaries. However, with the increase in cross-border anticompetitive business 
activities and proliferation of national CLP regimes around the world, nation states 
and national regulators have been facing challenges to apply domestic policies to 
address international conducts and conflicts arising from colliding antitrust regimes.  
Accordingly, internationalization of CLP is a concept that includes those 
attempts of governments/regulators and also alternative ways of dealing with cross-
jurisdictional anticompetitive conduct. There are different modes of 
internationalization of CLP, from unilateralism to cooperation, from convergence to 
supranationalization. Moreover, internationalization also occurs in different forms 
such as bilateral or multilateral arrangements, binding or non-binding agreements 
etc. 
Within this framework, it is seen that there have been various initiations for 
creating an international CLP system under different institutional settings and at 
different levels/modes. Currently, internationalization process of CLP draws an 
uneven, scattered and complex picture. Therefore, my aim in this thesis is to analyze 
the important factors in internationalization of CLP so that I can shed a light on the 
current state of the process and make implications about the future of international 
antitrust.  
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Although antitrust is regarded as a field of law, it is interdisciplinary in 
nature; having elements of law, economics and politics. Since it is a form of market 
regulation and applicable to certain conduct of firms, CLP is “about economics and 
economic behavior” (Whish, 2005: 1). Furthermore, despite prominent roles of 
lawyers and economists, politicians are also present in the field because enforcement 
of CLP is “dependent on political choices” (Dabbah, 2003: 57). Hence, as Dabbah 
(2003: 57) argues, an adequate understanding of CLP requires involvement of 
various disciplines: law, economics, political science and public administration. 
Thus it is argued in this thesis that an insight from another field of study is 
needed to examine internationalization of CLP: international political economy1 
(IPE). First, CLP itself is about regulating the markets. relationships between state 
and market and between state and firms are of primary importance in this policy area. 
Second, internationalization of CLP has become a phenomenon with the increase in 
cross-border business activities. Because IPE “studies life in global economy”, the 
situation of antitrust policy in global markets should be an area of interest for IPE 
(Oatley, 2006: 1). Third, it is thought that actors in the process of internationalization 
of CLP i.e. firms, MNCs, states, governments, markets, international organizations 
etc. and relationships between these actors can also be explained from the IPE 
perspective. Accordingly, internationalization of CLP is analyzed by utilizing IPE 
theoretical perspectives for a full understanding of the process. Moreover, there are 
                                                 
1 IPE can be defined as a field that “bridges the disciplines of economics and politics” and it is 
concerned with market-state relations as well as interactions between state and firms (especially 
multinational corporations (MNCs)), role of international organizations, international-domestic 
linkages etc (Cohn, 2005: 6-8).  
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not any studies conducted under the IPE field of study on international antitrust law 
and policy, yet.  
The aim of this thesis is to find an answer to the question what factors are 
important in the internationalization of CLP. Factors that lead to different modes and 
forms of internationalization of CLP should be analyzed in order to understand the 
reasons behind the current state of the process and future implications for a system of 
international antitrust. While doing that, I will utilize four main theoretical 
perspectives of IPE, i.e. realism, liberalism, historical structuralism and 
constructivism, to gain a new insight for internationalization of CLP and to 
understand which of these theories best explain the process. 
The thesis contains six chapters. After the introduction, in the second chapter 
I give a brief summary of IPE theories so that they can be utilized after examining 
the factors of internationalization of CLP. These theories are: realism, liberalism, 
historical structuralism and constructivism. 
The third chapter first explains what competition (antitrust) law and 
competition (antitrust) policy are, and the relationship between these two terms. The 
core provisions of competition law are discussed in this section to understand what 
kind of business practices are prohibited by law. In the second section, the 
conceptualization of “internationalization of CLP” is made. I divide this concept into 
sub-categories as unilateralism, cooperation and coordination, convergence, 
harmonization, binding international antitrust code and supranationalization, so that 
different forms of internationalization are covered. In the last section, attempts to 
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internationalization of CLP are summarized to discuss the modes and levels together 
with the actors in the process.  
In the fourth chapter, the literature on internationalization of CLP is given. 
Then, five important factors of internationalization of CLP are analyzed: 
globalization, sovereignty and conflicting national interests, differences between 
countries, role of EU-U.S. relationship and non-state actors. 
Chapter five discusses the EU’s process of supranationalization of CLP as a 
successful example and a role model for internationalization of CLP in the world. 
Because competition policy is one of the chapters in the acquis and Turkey is a 
country in the accession process, Turkish CLP is explained in the second section of 
this chapter. Furthermore, Turkey’s close trade relations with the EU (as a member 
of the Customs Union) and its place in the global economy as a developing country 
makes it a case worth analyzing. 
In the concluding chapter, four main IPE theoretical perspectives are utilized 
to understand the process of internationalization of CLP. Explanations of ground IPE 
theories on the factors of internationalization are discussed. It is argued that 
neoliberal institutionalism gives the most plausible explanation for the process of 
internationalization of CLP. Finally, second section of chapter six concludes the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
CLP AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
 
As it was argued before, concerning the internationalization of CLP, I argue 
that an insight from another field of study is needed: international political economy 
(IPE) can be/should be utilized .to introduce a new insight to the internationalization 
of CLP studies and to understand the process better. Since CLP is about regulating 
the markets, relationships between state and market and between state and firms are 
of primary importance and since IPE “studies life in global economy”, the situation 
of antitrust policy in global markets should be an area of interest for IPE (Oatley, 
2006: 1). Therefore, in this section, a brief summary of the four IPE theories are 
given, so that discussions can be made by utilizing them in subsequent chapters. 
These theories are realism, liberalism, historical structuralism and constructivism.  
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2.1. Realism 
 
Named also as mercantilism or economic nationalism in IPE, realism is one 
of the oldest approaches to state-market relationship. “The emphasis of mercantalists 
on the linkages between power and wealth was critical to the establishment of a 
realist perspective” (Cohn, 2005: 66). 
Realists believe that nation-state is the main actor in IPE and in an 
international environment where there is no central authority, states have to pursue 
their own interests and power. Because of the importance they give to national 
sovereignty, rational states should be powerful in order to defend their interests in an 
anarchical international system. Realists assume that politics/political economy is a 
zero-sum game and usually confliction (Frieden and Lake, 2000: 12).  
According to realists, there is a “hierarchy of issues in world politics” and 
“high politics” on military issues dominate the “low politics” in economic issues 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977: 24). Furthermore it is argued that powerful states shape the 
structure of “economic relation at the international level” (Cohn, 2005: 68). 
 
 
2.2. Liberalism 
 
In the liberal IPE, the state is not seen as a unitary actor: there are various 
actors and ‘multiple channels’ that are interrelated to each other: interstate, 
transgovernmental and transnational actors/relations (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 24-
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25).  In fact, “the liberal argument emphasizes how both the market and politics are 
environments in which all parties can benefit by entering into voluntary exchanges 
with other” (Firieden and Lake, 2000: 10). Moreover, the world system is not one of 
anarchy but of interdependence among actors. Since it is a positive-sum game, 
everyone gains from cooperation and “market relations … lead to positive outcomes 
for all” (O’Brien and Williams, 2007. 19).   
Consequently, in neoliberal institutionalism, institutions are defined as 
“related complexes of norms and rules [formal or informal], identifiable in space and 
time” (Keohane, 1988: 383). Within this framework, international institutions are 
thought to have the potential to maintain and increase cooperation. For neoliberal 
institutionalists, states are main actors in the anarchical international system and they 
follow their own interests. Yet, states’ interests are not limited to security and power; 
they have multiple interests. Furthermore, they focus on their actual or potential 
gains rather than relative gains. It is argued that, other than states, there are actors in 
the international system such as international organizations/agencies, supranational 
bureaucracies, firms etc. 
Regimes and institutions facilitate cooperation to secure national interests. 
Keohane (1984 :7) argues that cooperation is “essential in a world of economic 
interdependence, and … shared economic interests create demand for international 
institutions and rules”. Although it is difficult to achieve international cooperation 
especially in certain issue areas, it is argued by neoliberal institutionalists that “rule-
guided and norm-governed arrangements are far more common” than realist notions 
of anarchy suggests (Lipson, 1993: 80). Moreover they claim that “the ability of 
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states to communicate and cooperate depends on human constructed institutions” 
(Kayıhan, 2003: 11). 
 
 
2.3. Historical Structuralism 
 
Having the varieties such as Marxism, world-system theory, dependency 
theory, Gramscianism and neo-Gramscianism, the historical structuralism is hard to 
explain under one general title. Yet the basic feature of it is that historical 
structuralism “focus[es] on exploitative nature of capitalism” (Cohn, 2005: 117). 
Although liberals and realists take the capitalist mode of production as given, 
historical structuralists see capitalism (and market structure) as a problematic system 
that increases inequality and exploitation (Cohn, 2005: 127). Under capitalism, fair 
distribution of power and wealth is not possible; there is always an uneven 
development process between states, which increases the possibility for conflict 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007. 22).  
Furthermore, Gramsci focused on the role of “culture, ideas and institutions” 
on legitimization of dominant parties’ values, norms and interests (Cohn, 2005: 130). 
His argument is that the hegemon does not only rule by coercion, but by negotiating 
and creating common shared values and ideas, it gains the consent of subordinate 
groups and legitimizes its power.  
Writers such as Robert Cox and Stephan Gill, by following the ideas of 
Gramsci, “focused on the role of social forces and ideology in liberalizing and 
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globalizing economic relations” (O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 23). These neo-
Gramscians applied Gramsci’s ideas internationally and mentioned the emergence of 
a transnational historical bloc that included big MNCs, internationalist elements 
inside the state and international organizations (Cox, 1987). Accordingly, neoliberal 
economic policies were introduced as efficiency enhancing and good for everyone. 
Thus, to the extent that the neoliberal ideas in the process of globalization claimed to 
serve peoples’ best interests has diffused and been accepted with the consent of 
subordinate groups and then, the powerful could legitimize its power without any 
conflict and coercion.   
 
 
2.4. Constructivism 
 
Constructivists argue that since object, events and actors gain meaning only 
through “intersubjective knowledge and structure”, ideas are of primary importance 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 366). It is norms and values that shape actors’/agents’ 
interests and identities at the same time constituting those identities and interests 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 35).  
Abdelal et al. (2005: 23) claim that in the economic arena, agents’ ideas and 
beliefs about the effect of themselves and others’ actions shape the outcomes. Thus, 
ideas, beliefs and/or norms determine the actors’ preferences about economy, which 
shape the state of economy accordingly. The following sentence explains the main 
argument of the constructivist IPE very clearly: 
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A constructivist IPE argues that agents’ expectations and 
intersubjective beliefs constitute causal relationships in the 
economy by altering the agents’ own beliefs about the interests of 
others, upon which the realization of their own intersubjectively 
constructed interests depend (Abdelal et al., 2005: 24). 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (CLP) 
 
 
In this chapter, competition law and competition policy and the relationship 
between them are explained. Then, the conceptualization of “internationalization of 
CLP” is made and attempts to internationalization of CLP are summarized in the last 
section.  
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3.1 What is Competition Law and Policy? 
 
Competition law2 is one form of government regulation that aims to protect 
and promote competition in free market economy by regulating anticompetitive 
conduct (Taylor, 2006: 8, Jones and Sufrin, 2008: 1). It is considered that by 
protecting competition in markets, economic efficiency and increase in social welfare 
is achieved. As it is seen, competition law presumes the presence of free markets 
and/or market economy. This is an indication of the fact that the intellectual roots of 
competition law lie in neoclassical economic theory, which assumes that competition 
in the market increases efficiency, lowers prices and enhances innovation. In 
neoliberal thinking, competition law is seen as an instrument utilized by governments 
to intervene in the economy to correct market imperfections/failures (Taylor, 2006: 
15).  
Although the primary objective of competition law is to achieve economic 
efficiency and maximize social or consumer welfare3, it is observed that it is also 
utilized for other purposes such as protection of competitors and/or small firms, 
achieving fair competition, market integration (as in the case of the EU) or for socio-
                                                 
2 In this study, the terms “antitrust law/policy” and “competition law/policy” will be used 
interchangeably since antitrust is the American name of competition. On the other hand, the European 
Commission uses the term “antitrust” to donate the areas of competition law other than mergers and 
state aid. Yet, throughout the thesis, “antitrust law/policy” will be taken as the synonym of 
“competition law/policy”. 
3 Whether the goal of competition law should be increasing consumer welfare or social welfare is a 
debatable issue. Social welfare is accepted to be the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus in 
the economy. Hence, when competition law is concerned with consumer welfare rather than social 
welfare, redistribution of welfare between consumers and producers will be a concern of competition 
law (Sufrin and Jones, 2008: 13). Otherwise, redistributive effects will be ignored, bearing in mind 
that producers and consumers are not always separate entities. In the U.S. system, maximization goal 
of consumer welfare is clearly emphasized while in the EU this objective has recently started to be 
emphasized.  
 14 
political purposes such as employment, environmental issues etc (Sufrin and Jones, 
2008). Furthermore, competition law is claimed to provide long-term welfare 
accumulation and sustainable economic growth (Taylor, 2006: 21). Yet, in this study, 
the primary goal of competition law is emphasized: enhancing economic efficiency 
and increasing social/consumer welfare.  
Although there are different competition law systems in the world, they share 
certain core provisions: prohibition on anticompetitive collusion of market players, 
prohibition on abusive use of market power and prohibition of competition-reducing 
merger activities. These are briefly explained below: 
 
Anticompetitive Collusion/Arrangements: Any kind of collusive activity that two or 
more firms engage in and has an anticompetitive effect on the market is prohibited 
under this provision. Such arrangements could be between competitors (horizontal) 
or between for example suppliers and distributors (vertical). It is accepted that 
horizontal arrangements have more adverse effects on the competition process than 
vertical arrangements. Furthermore, cartels are regarded as the most anticompetitive 
of horizontal arrangements.  A cartel is defined by the European Commission as 
Arrangement(s) between competing firms designed to limit or 
eliminate competition between them, with the objective of 
increasing prices and profits of the participating companies and 
without producing any objective countervailing benefits” 
(European Commission, 2002). 
 
 In general, anticompetitive cartel activities range from price fixing, market 
sharing, limiting supply/output, allocation of consumers or territories etc. Cartels are 
harmful to society because when competitor firms/rivals become a member of a 
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cartel, they charge higher prices and gain higher profits than they would in 
competitive markets. Besides cartels, other forms of horizontal agreements and 
vertical agreements are prohibited by CLP as long as they are regarded as eliminating 
and distorting competition in the market.  
 
Abusive Use of Market Power: Not only anticompetitive arrangements between firms 
are prohibited under competition law but also unilateral or single conduct of firms 
may fall within the scope of it. Firms with a certain degree of market power are 
prohibited from using this power (or so-called dominant position) to eliminate or 
distort competition in the market. The reason for this prohibition is because such 
behavior deteriorates competition between firms, exploits consumers, excludes 
competitors from the market etc. Actions of a dominant firm (or a firm with 
market/monopoly power) such as predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, 
tying/bundling of products, refusal to deal/supply are prohibited when they distort 
competition in the market. 
 
Anticompetitive Mergers4: Mergers are prohibited under competition laws if they 
have a damaging effect on the competitive structure of the market. If a merger causes 
the creation or increase of merging parties’ monopoly power/dominant position, 
                                                 
4 “ Merger” is used in this study as comprehending both mergers and acquisitions. In fact, the terms 
“merger” and “acquisition” differ in the sense that as a result of a merger, merging parties disappear 
and a new entity is created, whereas, in an acquisition, one of the parties take over the other one and 
buyer firm survives.  Furthermore, the term “concentration” is used by the EU authorities instead of 
“merger”, “acquisition” and “joint venture”.  
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competition in the market lessens because of such a transaction and hence, merger is 
prohibited under competition law.  
 Horizontal mergers are more likely to cause competition concerns than 
vertical or conglomerate mergers because the number of competitors in the market 
decreases and the new merging entity starts to have a higher market share.  
 
 As it was explained above, competition law is a form of market regulation by 
governments. Competition policy, on the other hand, is a broader concept that 
includes a competition law system in it. At its broadest level, competition policy 
includes all kinds of government policy that “address the extent, nature and scope for 
competition in the economy” (Taylor, 2006: 28). Yet, competition law is the 
principal instrument of competition policy, which is used to implement competition 
policy by ensuring the competitive structure of markets (Taylor, 2006: 28, Jones and 
Sufrin, 2008: 2).  
 Generally, the terms “competition law” and “competition policy” are used 
interchangeably in the literature. Yet, they are distinguishable as it was explained 
above. In this study, I will use the term “competition law and policy” instead of using 
one of them or using them separately. By doing this, I refer to a system of market 
regulation by government, whose objective is to “promote the efficient operation of 
markets in order to maximize economic welfare” (Taylor, 2006: 29).  
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3.2. The Concept of Internationalization of Competition Law and Policy 
 
As it is the main theme of this study, it is thought that the conceptualization 
of “internationalization of CLP” is of significant importance. Although CLP had 
been seen as a domestic issue for several decades, this situation changed increasingly 
in the last half century because of internationalization of anticompetitive business 
practices and proliferation of national competition polices around the world. 
Countries reacted to this situation in many various ways such as application of 
domestic laws extraterritorially or engaging in different interactions with other 
countries.  
Consequently, the term “internationalization” is utilized in this study to cover 
all the alternative arrangements that have been or may be made between 
states/jurisdictions/competition agencies so that almost all forms, modes and/or 
levels of international political governance of CLP are analyzed.  
For practical purposes, I divide the modes of internationalization of CLP into 
five main categories, which are (i) unilateralism, (ii) cooperation and coordination, 
(iii) convergence, (iv) harmonization, (v) agreement on a binding international 
antitrust code and (vi) supranationalization. 
(i) Unilateralism:  States may react to the increasing level of 
international anticompetitive activity by applying their law and policy 
to intervene and regulate foreigners’ behavior. Hence, unilateralism is 
a “one-sided political action without any form of international 
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cooperation, partly even risking international conflicts because of 
negative cross-border spillovers” (Mitschke, 2008: 12). 
(ii) Cooperation and Coordination: Keohane (1984: 51) argues that 
international cooperation occurs “when actors adjust their behavior to 
the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of 
policy coordination”. Accordingly, in CLP context, cooperation and 
coordination mean those kinds of arrangements between states that 
include exchange of information and/or knowledge, technical 
assistance, consultation, notification of action, exchange of staff etc. 
Cooperation and coordination can be based on formal or informal as 
well as bilateral, regional or multilateral arrangements. Furthermore, 
these arrangements can be binding or non-binding (voluntary) in 
nature. Usually the aim is to assist each other through cooperation and 
coordination arrangements but it is also assumed that cooperation and 
coordination will “lead toward convergence” (Gerber, 1999: 127). 
(iii) Convergence: In its general terms, convergence refers to a 
“movement from a state of difference to a state of similarity” (Gerber, 
1999: 131). Concerning the international CLP, it means increasing 
shared characteristics (procedures, rules and understandings) between 
national CLP regimes. In this study, a bottom-up movement should be 
understood by convergence since it occurs because of states’ own 
choices rather than a binding top-down arrangement. Thus, 
convergence may increase as a result of formal or informal contacts of 
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states/agencies, cooperation arrangements in place, efforts of 
international organizations etc.  Damro (2005: 5) claims that 
“convergence covers changes to institutions, while cooperation covers 
changes in behavior”. 
(iv) Harmonization: According to Boodman (1991: 702), “harmonization 
is a process in which diverse elements are combined or adopted to 
each other so as to form a coherent whole while retaining their 
individuality”. Throughout this study, similar to Mitschke’s 
definition, I use the term as “bringing national laws in line with each 
other” (Mitschke, 2008: 12). For example, process of harmonization 
may include creation of identical CLP regimes. Although the results 
of process of convergence and harmonization could be similar (i.e. 
similar CLP systems), the difference between convergence and 
harmonization is harmonization’s relative top-down nature. 
Furthermore, according to Crane (2009: 151), one of the preconditions 
for meaningful harmonization of antitrust regimes is not only 
convergence of rules and procedures, but also the creation of 
international antitrust institutions.  
(v) Agreement on a binding international antirust code: This kind of 
arrangement refers to a situation in which countries agree on certain 
provisions under an international law system but without an 
autonomous institution that takes the power of national competition 
authorities away.  
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(vi) Supranationalization: Supranationalization means transfer of rights 
and powers from state-level to supranational level. 
Supranationalization of CLP is the transfer of law, policy and 
decision-making rights in the antitrust field to a supranational 
institution so that there is a unitary system of CLP applicable and 
prior over national regimes. For example, although EU member states 
have national CLP regimes, competition provisions in the Treaty of 
Rome and the decisions of the European Commission have dominance 
over national laws when anticompetitive practices have ‘Community 
dimension’.  
To sum up, internationalization of CLP covers all the above-mentioned 
modes and throughout this study, analysis and discussion will be on specific modes 
of internationalization of CLP as well as on the internationalization of CLP as a 
whole. Previous attempts to internationalization of CLP are explained in the next 
section by emphasizing different forms, levels and actors in the process.   
 
 
3.3. Attempts to Internationalization Competition Law and Policy 
 
In this section, a summary of previous attempts to internationalization of CLP 
are given. Although first attempts to create an international CLP go back to 1920s; 
starting from 1940s, there were also attempts to unilaterally deal with the 
international competition problems. Therefore, in this chapter, I will first give the 
unilateral attempts of countries/regulators and then I will move on to cooperation, 
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convergence and harmonization efforts of different actors. I will explain the efforts 
under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the United Nations 
(UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), works by the scholars and experts, the International 
Competition Network (ICN) together with the bilateral and regional arrangements 
between countries and/or competition agencies.  By covering all these efforts of 
internationalization of CLP, it is possible to assess the conditions that led to current 
situation and to make implications about the future.  
 
 
3.3.1. Unilateral Attempts (Extraterritorial Application of Domestic Laws) 
 
CLP, historically designed for application to the business enterprises that 
locate in a state’s own territory, started to become inadequate as anticompetitive 
business activities started to become international. 
As the first jurisdiction that had a CLP and as the world’s major economic 
power, the U.S. was the one of the first countries that had to deal with antitrust 
problems caused by increasing international economic activity. By increasing foreign 
business activities in the U.S., the anticompetitive practices of non-U.S. firms started 
to affect the U.S. economy adversely. 
For example, Country A’s textile exporters engage in a cartel activity and 
increase and fix prices of textile products they sell to Country B. Country B’s 
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consumers who buy these textile products have a loss in consumer welfare, since 
they are charged higher prices. There exists a welfare transfer from B’s consumers to 
A’s producers. In such a case, Country B intervenes in the market to correct this kind 
of market failure. 
 The reaction of the U.S. to such a situation was applying its domestic 
antitrust law extraterritorially. Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust rules by 
the U.S. regulators to non-U.S. firms was based on ‘effects doctrine’. According to 
this doctrine, as long as a conduct has an adverse effect on a country’s own territory, 
its national laws can be applied irrespective of the firm’s home country or of the 
place conduct has taken place.  
The first antitrust case that the U.S. applied its law extraterritorially based on 
the effects doctrine was Alcoa case in 1945 in. Furthermore, in 1992 The Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, it was concluded that the U.S. antitrust law can 
be applied where there is a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects of 
the conduct on the U.S. territory (Sweeney, 2010: 241). Yet, extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. antitrust law has been criticized especially by its major 
trading partners for being disrespectful to their sovereignties5.   
Although criticized substantially, extraterritorial application of domestic 
competition laws have extended to other jurisdictions because of the increase in 
international cases. For instance, the EU applies its competition rules 
extraterritorially but its application is not as broad as the U.S.’s effects doctrine. 
                                                 
5 The countries such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom started to response by enacting 
“blocking statutes” to exclude their citizens and companies from the extraterritorial application of the 
U.S. law (Gayton, 1997: 5), 
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However, there is still a general traditional hostility of some countries to 
extraterritorialism, even the European ones such as the UK and France: “respect for 
sovereignty affects the utility of applying domestic competition laws 
extraterritorially” (Sweeney, 2010: 247). Other than that, lack of power and lack of 
private actions cause only few states to expand the reach of their national laws 
beyond their borders (Sweeney, 2010: 245).  
 
 
3.3.2. Early Attempts 
 
There have been earlier attempts for dealing with antitrust problems in a way 
other than extraterritorial application. In 1927, League of Nations arranged a forum 
named World Economic Forum and during this Forum, a paper called ‘The Social 
Effects of International Industrial Agreements’ was presented by a professor of 
economics called William Oulaid and he proposed “regulatory co-ordination at the 
international level” to be able to prevent the negative effects of international cartels 
(Taylor, 2006: 148). Nevertheless, such a proposal did not attract attention since very 
small number of nations had competition laws in 1920s and their attitudes in this 
policy area had differed considerably (Taylor, 2006: 148).  
After the failed proposal of an international initiation for antitrust problems,  
years following the Great Depression and Second World War period witnessed the 
initiations for a stable international financial system and international trade openness, 
which were seen very important for the stability of international system (O’Brien and 
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Williams, 2007: 114). Hence post-war period is a period shaped mainly by the rise of 
“Western liberal economic order”, “U.S.’s international power” and “international 
organizations” (O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 114). The internationalization efforts of 
the period were mainly a reflection of U.S. interests that relied on open trade system 
ruled under a multilateral trade regime. For this reason, a meeting was held in 1947 
in Geneva and 23 nations agreed upon reduction of tariffs (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade-GATT) under a setting of  “a code of rules, a dispute settlement 
mechanism and a forum for trade negotiations” (O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 155). 
However, CLP was not one of the major priorities in the agenda since the main 
importance was given to liberalization of trade by reduced tariffs.  
After the GATT, The Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana 
in 1948 (also called ‘The Havana Charter), witnessed the attempts of creating 
International Trade Organization (ITO). Actually, ITO was a reflection of the 
Bretton-Woods setting, which led to the creation of international financial and 
monetary regimes after the Second World War in 1944, in the context of 
liberalization of international trade system. The plan designed at the Havana Charter 
was to regulate the international trade together with the regulation of cross-border 
competition (Taylor, 2006: 150). For this reason, Havana Charter’s fifth chapter 
(Article 46-54) included obligations on states to prevent restrictive business 
practices. This was an indicator of seeing antitrust law and policy as a part of 
liberalization agenda.  In Article 466, it is stated that: 
                                                 
6 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Final Act of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Employment, April 1948 available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf  
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Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall co-operate 
with the Organization to prevent, on the part of private or public 
commercial enterprises, business practices affecting international 
trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster 
monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects 
on the expansion of production or trade and interfere with the 
achievement of any of the other objectives act forth in Article 1. 
 
As it can be seen from the text, rules about the restrictive business practices 
were arranged quite comprehensive and states were obliged to prevent restrictive 
practices of their domestic enterprises that had a negative effect on international 
production, trade and objectives of the ITO. According to Article 50, member states 
are obliged to take necessary measures (such as legislation) to ensure that public or 
private enterprises in their jurisdictions do not engage in such practices. Business 
practices that should be prevented were also given in the third paragraph of Article 
46: 
(a) Fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed in dealing 
with others in the purchase, sale or lease of any product: 
(b) Excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any 
territorial market or field of business activity, or allocating 
customers, or fixing sales quotas or purchase quotas; 
(c) Discriminating against particular enterprises; 
(d) Limiting production or fixing production quotas; 
(e) preventing by agreement the development or application of 
technology or invention whether patented or unpatented; 
(f) extending the use of rights under patents, trade marks or 
copyrights granted by any Member to matters which, according to 
its laws and regulations, are not within the scope of such grants, or 
to products or conditions of production, use or sale which are 
likewise not the subject of such grants; 
(g) Any similar practices which the Organization may declare, by a 
majority of two thirds of the Members present and voting, to be 
restrictive business practices. 
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Moreover, in subsequent articles; a complaint procedure, a consultation 
procedure, an investigation procedure and a dispute resolution procedure were 
foreseen as well. Detailed and binding competition regime under the Havana Charter 
was never realized since the Charter itself fell through. The objection of the U.S. 
Congress to the ITO was the main reason of the failure. “With the failure of the ITO, 
the GATT became the institutional focus of the world trading system” (O’Brien and 
Williams, 2007: 155). Havana Charter included a total of 106 articles and out of 
them, 38 articles constituted the GATT. Of the 68 articles of the Havana Charter that 
were removed, nine articles were the above-mentioned Articles 45 to 54 of the 
Chapter 5, which included provisions on restrictive business practices.  
The failure of attempts to an international antitrust regime under the auspices 
of an international organization did not totally destroy the process for 
internationalization of CLP.  In 1953, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council prepared a Draft Convention on Restrictive Business Practices, which 
proposed an international cartel organization. This organization was structured in a 
manner that it would not “have any right of interference in the legislative practice of 
other nations” (Domke, 1955:135). The organization was only to make 
investigations, consultations and recommendations and its inability to require 
member states to pass competition laws was a weakness (Domke, 1955:135).  
Yet, the strength of the organization lied in its publicity (Domke; 1955: 137). 
This meant that the organization was going to make the investigations and 
recommendations accessible by public, which was planned to increase the 
effectiveness of its actions. Since enterprises are always worried about their 
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reputation, they were against the policy of publicity. Moreover, International 
Chamber of Commerce was also worried on the feasibility of the project since there 
were no agreed standards, definitions and legislation on antitrust policy and 
government restraints were more harmful than the business restraints such as cartels 
and monopolization efforts (Domke, 1955: 139). This initiative was again futile that 
such a convention was not realized.  
In the GATT  Report of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices in 1960, it 
is concluded that there are many states that do not even have competition legislation 
and this makes creation of common standards and rules on restrictive business 
practices very difficult (GATT, 1960). Because of absence of domestic competition 
laws in many jurisdictions, no consensus was reached and therefore a multilateral 
agreement on the issue was seen as a premature development.  
 
 
3.3.3 OECD 
 
Despite the ineffective efforts for an international antitrust code under the 
GATT and at the UN level till the end of 1950s, The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) decided to deal with antitrust issues by creating 
the Competition Law and Policy Committee (CLPC) in 1961 (Its name was the 
Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices up until 1987). “The CLPC’s 
purpose was to serve as a talking shop for OECD member agencies to collect and 
discuss information on antitrust and to promote harmonization” (Sokol, 2007: 47). 
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The Committee issued OECD Council Recommendations in 1967, 1973, 
1979, 1986, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2009.  Moreover, in 1996, Joint Group on 
Trade and Development (The Joint Group) was created to discuss the relationship 
between international trade and competition policy.  
The Recommendations aimed at promoting cooperation and convergence 
between competition agencies. For example, 1967 Recommendation encouraged 
members to initiate bilateral agreements while in 1998, it was recommended to enact 
domestic laws against hard-core cartel activities. Hard-core cartels whose activities 
include price fixing, output level limitations and market division,  were seen as 
illegal by all antitrust systems since there is no doubt that they increase prices in the 
market and hence reduce social/consumer welfare. Other than that, the Committee 
also engaged in publishing best practices and making peer reviews. Member 
countries’ competition agencies prepare discussion papers that include their 
agencies’ point of views and case law, which are assessed in several meetings and 
turn into best practices and recommendations.  
Despite promoting convergence and creating an international sense of 
antitrust, the Recommendations of the OECD are non-binding in nature and this 
factor limits the capacity of them to succeed their implementation.  Moreover, since 
OECD is a club of developed nations and developing country participation is rather 
limited, these Recommendations lack the ability of global adoption. The OECD, on 
the other hand, ended the works of the Joint Group in 2006 especially because of the 
U.S. concerns (Sokol, 2007: 51). 
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3.3.4. The UNCTAD 
 
Another international institution that also undertook a role in international 
antitrust issues is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). UNCTAD began studying on CLP in the 1970s when UNCTAD 
members started to engage in negotiations for a code on restrictive business practices 
(Sokol, 2007: 48). Since UNCTAD membership is open to all UN members and it is 
a setting that mostly developing countries have a role, UNCTAD’s initiations 
targeted larger number of parties, even the ones that did not have any competition 
laws. In 1980, UNCTAD adopted the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable, 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Anticompetitive Practices (The 
Set).  
The Set is a multilateral agreement on competition policy that recognizes the 
development dimension of CLP and provides:  
- A set of equitable rules for the control of anti-competitive practices, 
- A framework for international operation and exchange of best practices and  
- Vital technical assistance and capacity-building for interested member states 
so that they are better equipped to use competition law and policy for 
development.  
Moreover, in 1995, Model Competition Law was adopted to assist member states 
that do not have competition legislation.  
The main obstacle of the Set to have an impact on global antitrust regulation is its 
non-binding nature. Voluntary adoption of the Set makes its implementation by 
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member states dependent on their own will. Moreover, developing countries’ 
emphasis on trade and development issues also affected the content of the Set which 
caused “confusion and the failure to generate models of substantial usefulness” 
(Cluchey, 2007:84). 
 
 
3.3.5. Efforts by Academics and Experts 
 
Some group of scholars and experts also analyzed possible international 
institutional approaches to antitrust issues. They are worth mentioning since they 
have been influential for the future conduct between nation states/competition 
agencies on internationalization of CLP.  
Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and 
Competition Law brought a number of academics and experts together for outlining 
the current state of international CLP and making proposals for the future. This 
group of experts and academics, called the Munich Group, prepared a Draft 
International Antitrust Code (Draft Code) in 1993. In the Draft Code, a plurilateral 
agreement under the GATT regime was proposed. It included “the minimum 
standards that would need to be obeyed by contracting parties” and suggested that 
“an international antitrust agency would be established to safeguard the consistent 
application of national antitrust provision” (Piilola, 2003: 228). It was designed in a 
manner that its provisions were going to be applied in international cases only. For 
this reason, a creation of an international antitrust authority, with a power of 
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requesting national agencies to take appropriate measures, was foreseen. Actually, 
these proposals of the Munich Group, which mostly included European scholars, also 
reflected the differing points of views of the Europe and the U.S. on 
internationalization of CLP.  
A similar initiation by the European Commission in 1995 was the creation of 
an expert group for analyzing the current and the future situation of international 
antitrust. The 1995 Expert Group published a report called Competition Policy in the 
New Trade Order Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules (The Expert 
Group Report) ,which reflected the EU’s views on development of a multilateral 
framework on CLP (Cluchey, 2007: 75).  The Expert Group Report recommends a 
multilateral arrangement that would ensure states to incorporate minimum standards 
in their national legislations. (Piilola, 2003: 228). 
The above-mentioned reports and the European Union’s propositions for a 
multilateral competition regime created a suitable environment in 1990s for 
discussing an institutional setting for international CLP issues (Sokol, 2007: 49). The 
reflections of this situation can be seen in the efforts under the WTO starting from 
the middle of the 1990s.  
 
 
3.3.6. WTO 
 
With the increasing challenges of implementing national laws to international 
economic activities and transactions, their effects on international trade and with 
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detailed proposals for an international antitrust framework (especially those of the 
EU), the WTO decided in 1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference to establish 
the Working Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (The 
Working Group). Singapore Ministerial Declaration paragraph 20 states that: 
Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related 
to investment and competition policy and the built-in agenda in 
these areas, including under the  TRIMs Agreement, and on the 
understanding that the work undertaken shall not  prejudge 
whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we also agree 
to: 
- establish a working group to examine the relationship between 
trade and investment; and 
- establish a working group to study issues raised by Members 
relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, 
including anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas 
that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework (...) 
(WTO, 1996). 
 
Up until 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, The Working Group published 
several reports that included the issue areas to be discussed, works done, meetings 
held, conclusions reached etc. Most of the issue areas in the Working Group’s 
agenda were about the relationship between international trade and competition 
policy (Sokol, 2007: 50).  
In paragraph 23-25 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the focus of the 
Working Group was shifted towards the clarification of core principles, including 
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hard 
core cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation and support for progressive 
reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through capacity 
building (WTO, 2001). 
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  Although meetings of the Working Group continued, member states could not 
reach a consensus on the content of an antitrust framework under the WTO despite 
its limited agenda. Objections came from both the U.S. and from the developing 
countries. “By 2003, the Working Group agreed that any binding standards for 
antitrust law were not feasible or desirable” and the WTO dropped the CLP form its 
agenda, also ending the Working Group (Sokol, 2007: 51). 
 
 
3.3.7. ICPAC Report 
 
Following the works of the WTO and some other international organizations, 
in 1997, the U.S. initiated the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee 
(ICPAC) headed by the members of the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). The aim was to review the internationalization of antitrust to be able 
to clarify the U.S. situation in ongoing discussions. ICPAC published a report in 
2000 (The ICPAC Report). The ICPAC Report, rather than a multilateral binding 
framework under the WTO, promoted fostering the dialogue among competition 
agencies, providing technical assistance, increasing consultation and cooperation 
between authorities and hence developing greater convergence and soft 
harmonization of antitrust systems (ICPAC, 2000: 35, 284). The institutional settings 
proposed were a global competition initiative and bilateral cooperation agreements. 
In 2001, the global competition initiative was realized as the International 
Competition Network (ICN).  
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3.3.8. ICN 
 
In 2001, the ICN was established by fourteen jurisdictions, namely Australia, 
Canada, European Union, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Zambia. The ICN does not have a 
permanent secretariat, which is considered to be giving it flexibility. Instead, the ICN 
is guided by a 15-person Steering Group composed of representatives of ICN 
member competition agencies who serve in the Steering Group for two years. The 
work of the ICN is conducted by the working groups that “address competition issues 
on a project-by-project basis” (Blumenthal, 2004: 268). The works of these groups 
are discussed in workshops and annual meetings/conferences that member agencies 
and non-governmental bodies participate.  
The ICN appears to be a soft law organization that issues non-binding 
recommendations and best practices on antitrust issues. According to Sokol 
(2007:109), the goal of the ICN is not to implement harmonized and standard rules 
on antitrust issues but to “create consensus and adopt antitrust norms”. 
On the Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the 
International Competition Network (ICN, 2001), mission and activities of 
the ICN are explained as; 
- [p]roject-oriented, consensus-based, informal network of antitrust 
agencies from developed and developing countries that will address 
antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common interest and 
formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence 
through a results-oriented agenda and structure, 
- [e]ncourag[ing] the dissemination of antitrust experience and best 
practices, promot[ing] the advocacy role of antitrust agencies and 
seek[ing] to facilitate international cooperation, 
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- [A]ctivities (...) on a voluntary basis (...) rely[ing] on the high level 
of goodwill and cooperation among those jurisdictions involved, 
- [N]ot intended to replace or coordinate the work of other 
organizations, nor (...) [to] exercise any rule-making function, 
- (...) [Leaving] to the individual antitrust agencies to decide whether 
and how to implement the recommendations, through unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as appropriate. 
 
Moreover the ICN is described as an organization that “seek[s] advice and 
contributions from the private sector and from non-governmental organizations that 
are concerned with the application of antitrust laws (non-governmental advisers) 
(...)” (ICN, 2001). 
It is argued that despite ICN’s founding concept of ‘no power’, it has a power 
that comes from soft-norm formation, which can turn into hard law by time. In fact, 
according to a survey, “96% of competition agencies surveyed make use of ICN 
work products and materials, and 94% distribute them inside the agency. 77% use 
ICN materials for reference purposes, 46% for staff training and 40% for outreach. 
69% of all agencies say they are pro-actively working towards applying ICN 
Recommended Practices” (71% of emerging and 65% of established agencies) (Fox, 
2009: 166). 
 
 
3.3.9. Bilateral and Regional Agreements on CLP 
 
Bilateral Competition Agreements 
Taylor (2006: 108) argues that bilateral competition agreements (BCAs) can be 
seen as establishing “de facto international standard for cross border competition law 
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enforcement” when there is no multilaterally agreed rules on antitrust problems.  
There have been four phases of bilateral agreements on competition, which are: 
1. First Generation BCAs from 1976 (as passive cooperation agreements), 
2. Second Generation BCAs from 1988 (as negative comity agreements), 
3. Third Generation BCAs from 1988 (as positive comity and international 
enforcement assistance agreements), 
4. Fourth Generation BCAs (extension of jurisdiction agreements) (Taylor, 
2004: 108).  
First BCA was signed between the U.S. and Germany in 1976 as a response to 
the OECD Recommendations. Agreements between the U.S. and Australia (1982), 
between the U.S. and Canada (1982) and between Germany and France (1987) 
followed (Taylor, 2006: 109). These first generation BCAs mainly aimed at reducing 
the tensions between jurisdictions that had aroused from extraterritorial application 
of national laws. However, the U.S.-Germany agreement has a different character in 
the sense that its main motivation was increasing cooperation between agencies 
rather than reducing the conflicts that resulted from the U.S.’s extraterritorial 
enforcement (Zanettin, 2002: 61). As major “economic and political partners”, the 
U.S. and Germany shared similar views on extraterritorial application of national 
CLP and they did not have any disputes concerning the issue (Zanettin, 2002: 62).  
First generation BCAs mostly included notification, information exchange, 
cooperation and consultation requirements which were quite limited in nature 
(Taylor, 2006: 109). Second and third generation BCAs were negotiated after the 
weaknesses of the previous ones had been realized and the concept of ‘comity’ was 
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introduced in these agreements. Negative comity clause “refers to an obligation 
placed on an enforcing nation to consider the interests of an affected nation when 
enforcing its domestic laws and to refrain from taking enforcement action that 
adversely affects the interests of the affected nation” (Taylor, 2006: 110). Positive 
comity on the other hand, provide the affected nation to request the other party to 
examine the anticompetitive practices that are taking place  within the other party’s 
territory but  causing harm in affected party’s territory.  
Fourth generation BCAs on the other hand, have occurred very rare. The 
BCA between the New Zealand and Australia signed in 1998 can be given as an 
example. This agreement allows parties to extend their legislative prohibitions to 
cover both jurisdictions. Taylor (2006: 120) argues that since New Zealand and 
Australia have similar legal systems and highly harmonized competition laws and 
since this agreement was part of a larger harmonization attempt of both parties’ 
business laws, it has reached well beyond the boundaries of current BCAs. Yet, “it 
indicate[s] what may be achievable between nations with closely integrated 
economies, an existing extensive bilateral trade and economic relationship, similar 
competition laws, similar cultures and similar legal systems” (Taylor, 2006: 120).  
As the major powers of the world economy, the U.S. and the E.U. signed a 
bilateral competition cooperation agreement in 19917. The agreement includes 
negative and positive comity clauses together with reciprocal notification of cases 
                                                 
7 Agreement between the United States of America and the Commission of the European 
Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, 23 Sptember 1991 [1991] 5 
CMLR 517. After an inter-EU challenge to the agreement (mainly form France), the ECJ concluded 
that the EC could not enter into agreements with other countries and therefore the agreement could be 
concluded in 1995 (Jones and Sufrin, 2008: 113). 
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under investigation when there is an interest of either party, exchange of non-
confidential information, meetings between officials, assistance and coordination. 
Between the years 1991-1999, the U.S. and the EU cooperated in 689 cases, 358 of 
which were notified by the EU while the U.S. notified 331 of them (Yevust in 
Piilola, 2003: 241).  
Since the 1991 Agreement was seen as a success by both parties, they agreed 
on clarification of application of the positive comity clause and hence concluded the 
Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United 
States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the 
Enforcement of their Competition Laws (Positive Comity Agreement) in 1998.  
 
CLP provisions in Regional Agreements 
Regional free trade and/or cooperation agreements also contain certain 
provisions on CLP. The Asia Pacific Cooperation Organization (APEC) is an 
example for regional cooperation agreements. It is an institution that promotes “free 
trade and practical economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region” (Taylor, 2006: 
71). APEC has 21 member countries that have substantial differences in their 
economic development levels8. Differences in levels of economic development are 
also reflected by the differences in their competition laws and policies. For instance, 
the U.S. has the Sherman Act since the 19th century while China has passed its 
competition law very recently.  
                                                 
8 The APEC member countries are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of 
China, HongKong,China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, The United 
States and VietNam. Available at www.apec.org.  
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In 1999, APEC members endorsed the “APEC Principles to Enhance 
Competition and Regulatory Reform”. These principles are non-binding and 
voluntary in nature and it is emphasized in the text that they take into account the 
“diverse circumstances of economies in the region” (APEC, 1999). The APEC 
competition principles are non-discrimination, comprehensiveness, transparency, 
accountability and implementation (APEC, 1999). It is seen that the aim of endorsing 
these principles is not harmonizing the national competition policies of the member 
countries but to increase cooperation and convergence. Taylor (2006: 124) argues 
that the APEC example shows that when countries have different levels of economic 
development and of competition culture with “low to moderate degree of economic 
integration”, promoting cooperation and convergence is a better strategy than 
harmonizing CLPs.  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a regional trade 
agreement between Canada, Mexico and the U.S. to implement a free trade area. It 
entered into force on January 1, 1994. It includes only few provisions on competition 
policy. In Articles 1501 of the Agreement, it is stated that  
Each Party shall adopt or maintain measures to proscribe 
anticompetitive business conduct and take appropriate action with 
respect thereto; recognizing that such measures will enhance the 
fulfillment of the objectives of this Agreement (NAFTA, 1994). 
 
Although the NAFTA has a dispute settlement mechanism for resolving trade 
disputes between national industries and/or governments, parties of the Agreement 
do not have recourse to dispute settlement for the competition related matters. This 
situation shows that members of the NAFTA do not prefer any limitation on their 
powers concerning the implication of CLP. 
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Attempts to internationalization of CLP are discussed in this chapter. Firstly, 
the unilateral responses to internationalization of anticompetitive business activity, 
i.e. extraterritorial application are explained. Although it is a way to deal with 
international antitrust problems, the sovereignty concerns and capabilities of 
countries seem to limit the use of extraterritoriality. Later on, 
cooperation/coordination, convergence and harmonization efforts starting from the 
1920s are explained. It is seen that the attempts of states, competition agencies and 
international organizations are among the most effective ones. Yet, the role of 
international organizations in the internationalization of antitrust is mostly seen a 
result of state preferences because states usually draw the line for the initiations of 
international organizations. 
Reflecting the state preferences does not mean these organizations are not 
effective in the process; most of them actively contribute to cooperation and 
convergence efforts taking place at the international level. The table produced by 
Damro (2005: 20) gives an excellent summary of the legal features that these 
organizations have: 
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Table 1: Legal Features of International Organizations 
OECD  
UNCTAD Competition 
Committee 
Global 
Forum  
WTO ICN 
International 
Coverage Multilateral 
Developed 
countries Multilateral Multilateral Multilateral 
Primary 
Target 
Developing 
countries All countries 
Developing 
countries All countries All Countries 
Issue 
Mandate Trade-plus Trade-plus 
Competition 
only Trade-plus 
Competition 
only 
Objective 
Cooperation 
and 
Convergence 
Cooperation and 
Convergence N/A* 
Cooperation 
and 
Convergence 
Means to 
Objective 
Primarily 
discretionary 
and non-
binding 
Primarily discretionary and 
non-binding 
Binding with a 
Dispute 
Settlement 
Mechanism* 
Primarily 
discretionary 
and non-
binding 
*: Damro lists these categories as “N/A” since it was decided to remove competition 
policy from Doha Round. Source: Damro (2005: 20) 
 
It is seen that the institutionalization of competition issues in the WTO had 
been a too ambitious project that had to be inactivated because of the diverging 
opinions among developed countries and between developed and developing 
countries. Therefore, now, the WTO does not have a role in the internationalization 
of CLP; discussions on competition policy had been suspended. 
Although non-binding in nature, the OECD and the UNCTAD are seen as 
“useful instruments to support cooperation between competition authorities” 
(Mitschke, 2008: 40). Nevertheless since they have limited memberships (developed 
countries in the case of OECD and developing ones in the UNCTAD), these 
institutions are not seen as ‘the’ institutions for internationalization of CLP.  
The ICN on the other hand has distinct approach to internationalization of 
CLP. According to ICN web site, the ICN is unique as it is the only international 
body devoted exclusively to competition law enforcement and its members represent 
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national and multinational competition authorities.  Damro (2005: 21) argues that 
since governments are not involved in its processes, the ICN enables competition 
authorities to use their own discretionary authority in a less formal and bureaucratic 
setting. Moreover, due to ICN’s non-binding voluntary nature, it does not touch upon 
the national interests and sovereignty concerns of countries and this makes it easier 
to enhance “bottom-up convergence” and cooperation between member agencies 
(Mitschke, 2008: 42). 
Concerning the bilateral arrangements, they are generally between 
competition agencies and have non-binding provisions on cooperation and 
coordination. Similarly regional agreements on economic cooperation or free trade 
have non-binding clauses on competition issues.  
To conclude, state preferences and concerns seem to shape the 
internationalization of CLP together with the efforts of competition authorities and 
international organizations. The reason for internationalization efforts seem to stem 
primarily from internationalization of economic (and hence anticompetitive) activity. 
Coordination and cooperation efforts show that national competition agencies no 
longer have the ability to cope with global antitrust problems alone. Yet, the inability 
to agree on binding international competition rules can be seen as a result of states’ 
sovereignty concerns, differences on their objectives on application of CLP and on 
their economic development levels. For example, developed economies tend to sign 
bilateral agreements with the countries they trade, which have certain degree of 
development levels and competition rules. 
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In the light of these explanations, important factors of internationalization of 
CLP are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
FACTORS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CLP 
 
 
In the previous chapter, review of the attempts to internationalization of CLP 
is given. It is understood that state preferences and efforts of competition agencies 
and international organizations are important in the process. Moreover, increase in 
international anticompetitive activity, sovereignty concerns of countries, sharing 
similar antitrust concerns, being close trading partners, having similar development 
levels together with competition and institutional/policy-making cultures levels seem 
to be important factors shaping the process of internationalization of CLP. 
In this chapter, factors of internationalization of CLP are discussed in detail. 
In 4.1., a brief summary of the literature on internationalization of CLP is given by 
focusing on the factors that scholars in international antitrust field see as important in 
internationalization of CLP. Then in Chapter 4.2., I will explain the important factors 
of internationalization of CLP based on the previous attempts and literature review 
sections of the study. 
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4.1 Literature Review 
 
When we look at studies on international antitrust issue, it is seen that the 
main focus has been the level of international interaction and the type of institutions 
that regulate the relationship between states and/or their national competition 
agencies.   
Andrew Guzman (2001; 2004), as one of the main contributors of 
international CLP literature, argues that there should be substantive international 
standards for antitrust and the WTO is the preferred institution for such a setting.  
In his earlier article, Guzman (2001) suggests a new regime for international 
antitrust which should contain substantive standards and he proposes WTO as the 
governing body of the new system. Concerning the current state of cooperation, with 
the increase in international business activities, tools that the national competition 
authorities have in their hands became insufficient, which caused them to cooperate 
with each other in order to maintain their enforcement capability domestically 
(Guzman, 2001: 1144).  
The most preferred form of cooperation has been bilateral agreements in 
which information sharing between states/authorities constitute the main part 
(Guzman, 2001: 1145). Guzman (2001: 1146) calls this type of cooperation as 
“procedural cooperation” and he claims that there are not any substantive cooperative 
chapters or minimum standards on these agreements as it can be expected from “self-
interested states and administrative agencies seeking to preserve their own 
influence.” In other words, the reason for cooperation in the form of bilateral 
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agreements between antitrust authorities is to gather information outside their own 
territory and, by this way, to continue enforcing their domestic laws without any 
troubles caused by increasing international business activities. Such form of 
cooperation shall not regulate the global economy but it shall only adopt domestic 
agencies to “international challenges” (Guzman, 2001: 1146).  
In another article, Guzman (2004: 355) argues that noncooperation includes 
risks such as “transaction costs” especially for businesses since they have to deal 
with different antitrust regulation systems, “the risk of biased prosecutions” since all 
firms have their home countries and increased “international activity” due to the lack 
of an effective enforcement system for illegal international activities. In the present 
system, since multinational firms should deal with antitrust agencies in different 
countries, they have to bear multiple costs such as hiring many legal representatives, 
preparing lots of different documents, meeting requirement of all jurisdictions etc 
(Guzman, 2004:355). Moreover, this causes different regulators reviewing the same 
transaction and hence creating time costs (Guzman, 2004:355).  
A domestic antitrust authority not only deals with domestic firms but also 
with international firms that have business activities in its country and/or whose 
activities have effect in its territory. Therefore, according to Guzman (2004: 356), it 
is possible that national regulators will apply national laws laxer to domestic firms 
and tougher to international ones. He gives export cartel exemptions as an example 
for such a situation.  
The main argument of Guzman is that in the absence of cooperation between 
agencies, substantive antitrust policies are harmed by international trade and making 
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accurate policies becomes impossible due to diverging interests of countries (2004: 
357-359)9. If a country is a net exporter, anticompetitive conducts held by domestic 
firms will adversely affect foreign markets while benefiting those domestic firms. On 
the other hand, a net importer country shall apply stricter competition policies since 
local consumers may be affected from the anticompetitive activities of foreign firms.  
Guzman (2004: 363-365) claims that divergent interests, which are the result 
of countries’ import-export balance, create divergent preferences for or expectations 
from negotiations on international antitrust regime. Moreover, as long as states have 
divergent preferences, it is impossible to reach a consensus unless concessions are 
made. Since there is such a need for compensation of losses and transfer payments, 
then a setting in which only competition issues are discussed will not suffice. 
Therefore, Guzman (2001: 1156; 2004: 365) proposes that antitrust negotiations 
should be carried in a “sufficiently broad institutional context” where transfers can 
be made so that a potential loser of the negotiated competition regime can be given 
compensations in other issue areas such as intellectual property or environment.   
Guzman (2001: 1157; 2004: 372) claims that concluding an agreement on an 
international scale is “best from a global perspective” and national incentives of 
states cannot be dealt without an agreement on ‘substantive’ rules. Moreover, an 
agreement that makes the current regulatory system better off should be dealt under 
the auspices of the WTO. He gives two main reasons for his proposal as the ability to 
make transfer payments and ability to use the dispute solution system (DSS) in the 
WTO.  
                                                 
9 In his argumentation, Guzman (2004: 357) assumes that “each state pursues its own interests without 
regard for the other states’ interests” and “states do not consider foreign costs and benefits at all.”  
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According to  Guzman (2001), DSS is important because even there is an 
agreement on the international substantive antitrust standards, states may avoid 
obeying the rules, which makes the agreement meaningless. For states to honor their 
commitments and to make an agreement credible10, DSS is so far the best setting 
(Guzman, 2001: 1158). In his earlier article (2001), Guzman proposes an 
international regulatory system that should include substantive antitrust rules and that 
should be under WTO. In the latter one (2004), he also explains how to achieve an 
agreement. He (Guzman, 2004: 373) argues that first of all nondiscrimination 
principle, especially containing national treatment clause, could be useful for 
preventing export cartel exemptions and a “slightly more ambitious WTO agenda11” 
is a good start for deeper cooperation in international antitrust. 
Eleanor M. Fox, in her article Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Race Up, 
Down and Sideways (2000), examines the concepts of “regulatory competition” and 
“regulatory federalism” concerning the CLP. CLP has been national and the markets 
have been mostly global, while there has been an increase in the discussions for the 
internationalization of CLP (Fox, 2000:1781). The first point Fox mentions is the 
differences between goals of national CLPs and how such differences affect the 
internationalization process. She calls the conception of the U.S. antitrust system as 
“efficiency law” in which competition law is seen as a “tool to produce efficiency 
through markets” (Fox, 2000: 1782-1783). On the other hand, Fox (2000: 1782) 
                                                 
10 Other than a dispute resolution procedure, Guzman (2001:1158) also mentions “reputational 
constraints”. 
11 He quotes from the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration: “core principles, including transparency, 
non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hard core cartels; [and] modalities for 
voluntary cooperation…” 
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argues, some competition laws aim to protect small businesses, to make fair access 
possible (“fairness law”).  
Fox examines whether nations may make or modify their competition laws to 
compete with other states for foreign investment, new business etc (Fox, 2000: 
1788). In other words, Fox analyzes if regulatory competition is a factor that lead to 
the internationalization of antitrust12.  Fox (2000: 1793) argues that given the U.S. 
style less interventionist efficiency based antitrust law; the EU may see itself in a 
race with the U.S. to the bottom.  
Fox also mentions the competition between the U.S and the EU to expand the 
number of nations that have antitrust regimes that are similar to theirs. She argues 
that the nation who can expand its own antitrust system will have a stronger place in 
the world economy. 
Accordingly, Fox (2000: 1802) argues that in a global economy like the one 
today, “[t]here is a need for an international economic order in which at least some 
players are charged with responsibility to enhance the welfare of the entire 
community”.  Nevertheless, states’ first concern is still their national problems rather 
than international or global problems and they do not want to lose their sovereignty 
on various policy areas (Fox, 2000: 1802). Hence domestic interests and fear of 
losing sovereignty are factors that determine the states’ choice of international 
governance structure for antitrust. 
                                                 
12 Regulatory competition is assumed to occur when states compete with each other to attract new 
investment into their own territories. The tools states use for this purpose include laxer law regimes in 
issues such as environment, lower taxation etc.  
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Keeping those main concerns of states in mind, Fox claims that some 
problems should be and can be solved at the international level. She proposes 
measures such as “transparency, national treatment, mutual respect, due process and 
a prophylactic principle in favor of openness”, which are mainly GATT/WTO 
principles (Fox, 2000: 1806). Fox (2000: 1807) concludes that for CLP, regulatory 
competition is a “side track” and the main question is on “regulatory federalism”: 
“How should we, how can we, reorder economic regulation so that it works for use 
as citizens of the world?” 
In another article, Fox (2003) in a way tries to answer the above-mentioned 
question. She compares “horizontalists”, who think that even global solutions of the 
day can be solved at the national level (extraterritorial application and/or nation-to-
nation cooperation such as bilateral agreements and ICN) and “internationalists”, 
who claim that “global-level solutions” are necessary for some problems of antitrust 
(Fox, 2003: 912).   
Within this framework, she analyzes three different problems. The first one, 
inbound restraints, is regulated with the help of “effects doctrine” that allows states 
to apply their national laws for activities held outside but have effects inside their 
territories. U.S. antitrust law allows to use effects doctrine but Fox (2003: 917) 
argues that developing countries cannot use it effectively since some do not have 
antitrust laws and some others do not have enforcement capabilities/resources 
/power. Moreover, there is the possibility of conflicting policies of countries. Second 
problem is the evidence located abroad. Although bilateral arrangements are helpful, 
they have their own shortcomings. The third problem is about the 
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competition/industrial policy interface solved nationally, which is not a national-only 
problem.  
Fox concludes that both national or nation-to-nation cooperation arrangement 
and higher-level solutions should be used together to solve global problems such as 
global mergers and world cartels.  
Harmonization of competition policy is examined by Daniel Crane (2009) in 
three aspects: priority issues of harmonization, necessary conditions for 
harmonization and substance, procedure and institutions in harmonization process. 
By ‘harmonization’, he refers to the “increased international homogenization of 
antitrust norms” (Crane, 2009: 143). Crane (2009: 151-152) mentions three 
“preconditions for meaningful harmonization.” The first of these is a general 
agreement on the legitimacy of market economies and governments’ intervention on 
the market. Since antitrust law and policy regulates free markets by intervening in 
business practices, the “legitimacy of a regulated market economy” should exist for 
trusting international decision-making in CLP (Crane, 2009: 152).  
Second, a consensus between harmonizing institutions on the goal of  
antitrust regulation is another condition for harmonization since agreement on 
“modes” will have no benefit without agreeing on “why and for whose benefit” the 
antitrust policy is (Crane, 2009: 152). Third, Crane (2009: 153) argues that for 
harmonization to occur effectively, international decision-makers should not have to 
cogitate on the distributional consequences of their polices, in other words an 
international competition agency should not deal with political matters. 
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Crane (2009: 155-156) claims that the realization of the first two criteria 
mentioned above is difficult; hence he proposes taking “a number of small, 
incremental steps” as a beginning for future harmonization. He argues that by 
starting with procedural arrangements that do not raise sovereignty and ideological 
concerns, formal antitrust norms could be set and reaching agreements on 
“substantive norms and international institutions” gets easier (Crane, 2009: 157).  He 
gives a unified international premerger notification protocol, as an example of steps 
for antitrust homogeneity in the coming years (Crane, 2009: 158).   
Frederic Jenny (2003) takes into account the international cooperation part of 
internationalization process. He defines cooperation between national regulatory 
agencies in a way that he includes case specific cooperation such as exchange of 
confidential/non-confidential information, joint investigations and non-case specific 
cooperation  (technical assistance, positive and negative comities, recommendations, 
peer reviews etc.) (Jenny, 2003: 3-4). After reviewing the bilateral, regional and 
multilateral cooperation agreements on competition, Jenny (2003) claims that the 
younger agencies’ need for the experience of older regimes, new challenges created 
by the technological advances starting from nineties, globalization of markets, 
increasing number of international merger activity and lobby of the business 
community together with skepticism of domestic institutions on the behavior of 
national antitrust agencies have been factors of international cooperation in antitrust.  
Jenny (2003: 19) concludes that “there are two major reasons for the 
development of international cooperation on antitrust enforcement: the rapid 
globalization of a number of markets and the proliferation of countries adopting 
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antitrust law.” Since globalization is here to stay and since the number of countries 
adopting competition laws is increasing, there is a growing need for a multilateral 
framework for international cooperation that includes “transparent, fair and 
effective” mechanisms of cooperation and at the same time respects the sovereignty 
concerns of states (Jenny, 2003: 20).  
Paul Stephan (2005) accepts the globalization phenomena and increasing 
international transactions together with the limitations of nations states in such a 
system, but he argues that the development of international technocracy in antitrust 
has its own problems. First of all, Stephan (2005: 177-179) sees competition policy 
as an “undefined concept” and different meanings and implementations create 
“significant differences in national competition policies.” He argues that competition 
policy and trade policy are much related. He accommodates international trade 
theory to show that applying competition law to externalize the costs of international 
trade and internalizing the benefits (for example by selectively applying it to foreign 
producers rather than domestic ones) creates a global welfare deteriorating trade 
barrier that is too hard to determine (Stephan, 2005: 185). Other than that, in the 
political economy side, public choice theory suggests that governments reflect the 
interests of powerful domestic interest groups rather than consumers. Hence this 
theory also shows that national competition policies will have protectionist goals that 
lower global welfare and these factors will create differing competition laws and 
policies (Stephan, 2005: 186).  
Baring in mind the different conceptions and goals of national competition 
policies that are used as tools for trade protection, Stephan (2005: 186) hypotheses 
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that “in a world where international trade occurs, one and only one competition 
policy can maximize global welfare.” According to Stephan (2005: 187), 
disagreement on the consequences of policy choices between states (horizontal 
variation) and presence of interest groups that aim to externalize the costs of 
international trade in a state (vertical variation) are the reasons of variation in 
antitrust regulations. To support this argument, Stephan (2005: 187-194) analyzes the 
competition laws and enforcement practices of three major economic powers: U.S., 
EU, and Japan. He finds that; 
- Institutional structures of them differ. 
- Substantive goals of their antitrust laws, despite similar wordings, differ 
in practice. 
- There is a motive and opportunity (such broad and nonspecific standards) 
to discriminate against foreigners in both of three jurisdictions. 
By these finding, Stephan (2005: 193-194) concludes that competition policy 
can be affected from protectionist pressures as well and the reasons why states 
restrict international trade can be much related with their reasoning while 
implementing competition laws.  
If the current situation creates a loss in global welfare and if only one (global) 
competition policy can increase global welfare, then internationalization of antitrust 
becomes the core issue. Here internationalization is used in the sense of convergent 
policies and harmonization standards.  
Stephan analyzes different propositions and possibilities such as soft 
harmonization, international agreement under the WTO, and allocation of regulatory 
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jurisdictions among major powers such as bilateral agreements. Contrary to many 
states and scholars who see international institutions as a solution for international 
antitrust problem, he proposes to dispense with international institutions. Instead he 
argues that international anarchy rather than international cooperation can work in 
internationalization of antitrust. States that have protectionist competition policies 
protecting inefficient local businesses will have to alter their position for not to lose 
their international competitiveness and therefore there will not be a need for 
international institutions to regulate antitrust. 
Daniel Tarullo (2000) argues that internationalization of antitrust is very 
much related with its institutional configuration. He analyzes different institutional 
settings in which international antitrust policy is dealt; the WTO, the OECD and 
bilateral cooperation agreements. Firstly he identifies the problems associated with 
the internationalization of antitrust as 1) anticompetitive activities that cannot be 
solved solely by national regulators (transnational cartels and 
oligopolies/monopolies), 2) conflicting antitrust enforcement between states 
(extraterritoriality and merger reviews), 3) burden on business due to duplication of  
enforcement and 4) market access issues (Tarullo, 2000: 479-481). 
 After giving the major problems, he explains whether they can be solved 
under different institutional contexts. He concludes that neither the WTO, nor the 
OECD, nor bilateral agreements can deal with the problems of international antitrust 
alone. Instead, different problems should be solved under different institutional 
settings and therefore he proposes a “multiforum response” to those problems 
(Tarullo, 2000: 500).  
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The EU and the U.S. have had different views on the institutional setting that 
the internationalization of antitrust should take place. Since these two are the major 
economic powers, such a conflict between them has attracted attention. Arguing that 
the “outcome of this conflict will shape the globalization of antitrust law”, David 
Gerber (1999: 123-124), examines the factors that “shape the perspectives and 
positions of the parties.” In this way, although indirectly, Gerber analyzes the 
conditions that shape internationalization of antitrust. He claims that there are several 
factors such as domestic politics, international politics and economic incentives, yet 
he focuses on ‘legal experience’ of the parties that shape their positions in the 
conflict (Gerber, 1999: 124). He gives three factors of legal experience that affect the 
conflict on internationalization of competition law. These are legal cultures affecting 
the way participants perceive recent and future situations, legal experience shaping 
the preferences and values of these perceptions and legal experience shaping 
expectations from legal systems (Gerber, 1999: 124).  
Reviewing the two sides’ point of views, Gerber (1999: 129-130) claims that 
while the European side insists on a comprehensive and systematic framework for 
competition law, i.e. an international agreement, under the auspices of the WTO, the 
U.S. is interested in soft policies of cooperation and convergence. Hence, the main 
reason of the conflict lies in the perception of a need for an international framework 
for competition law. Convergence, which is an “independent choice by states” and as 
“increase in shared characteristics” without any international agreement, is a result of 
socialization of the parties, efforts of international organizations together with the 
EU and the U.S. “and  ‘invisible hand’ of rationality” (Gerber, 1999: 131-132).   
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Gerber (1999: 133) argues that although the U.S. side is experienced in these 
convergence mechanisms, the EU decision-makers think, in consistency with their 
experiment, that there should be “some agreement that requires decisional 
convergence.” Again, legal experiences determine the way two sides assess the 
obstacles about the scope and efficiency of cooperation. Gerber (1999: 137) states 
that the “U.S. participants are less aware of and less concerned about those obstacles 
than their European counterparts” because of differing legal experiences. Projection 
and prediction about the creation of an international competition framework is also 
different between two parties.  
While such an idea is familiar and doable for the Europeans due to their 
community building efforts and national experiences, the U.S. antitrust law is more 
case-centered rather than framework-based (Gerber, 1999: 137-139). Concerning the 
preferences, Gerber (1999: 139-140) claims that Europeans prefer a comprehensive, 
consistent and systemized framework similar to their integration process and national 
experiences; on the other hand U.S. side’s preferences focus on fact and case-law 
based regime just like in their common law system. To sum up: 
Both sides tend to favor an international response that functions 
along lines with which they are familiar and corresponds to the 
values that support the decision-making process they use (Gerber, 
1999: 140). 
 
Concerning the lack of a support for a competition framework under the 
auspices of the WTO, Mervyn Martin (2008) argues that the reason was the 
difference in development levels between members of the WTO. Disparity in 
development leads to differences in needs of countries and thus the way they assess 
internationalization of CLP. Signing bilateral agreements as an example of practical 
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cooperation does not seem workable for developing countries since some of them 
still do not have competition laws and even for the ones who have antitrust laws, 
usually they can not get into bilateral cooperation with developed countries or they 
become the weaker part of the agreement (Martin, 2008: 300-302).  
Technical cooperation on the other hand, will be successful as long as both 
developed and developing countries show effort for that. Martin (2008: 304-305) 
analyzes the viability of harmonization efforts and concludes that divergent 
approaches of major players and marginalization of developing countries are main 
concerns. In the article, although it is not likely to be realized in the near future, the 
WTO is seen as the most appropriate institution for competition negotiations to take 
place because of its existing mechanisms and membership (Martin, 2008: 314). 
 
 
4.2. Determining the Factors of Internationalization of CLP 
 
By using the findings of  Chapter three and the previous section, five 
important factors of internationalization are analyzed in this section, which are 
globalization, sovereignty concerns and conflicting national interests, differences 
between countries, the role of the EU-U.S. relationship and the role of non-state 
actors. 
The primary factor in the internationalization process is thought to be 
globalization (Fox, 2000; Jenny, 2003; Stephan, 2005). It is seen that the main drive 
for internationalization of CLP is the increasing number of international 
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(anticompetitive) firm conduct. With the business activities (trade, production, 
distribution etc) spreading to various markets, as Guzman (2001) argues, tools that 
the national regulators have became insufficient.  
Although extraterritorial application of domestic laws and policies is a way to 
protect competition in a country’s domestic market, it causes conflicts in the 
international arena because no country wants another law and policy to be applied in 
its own territory.  Other than that, because states/regulators do not want to give up 
their powers on CLP issues, they do not agree on international antitrust rules or 
establishment of supranational antitrust institutions. Inability to agree on common 
standards under the auspices of the WTO and voluntary nature of other multilateral 
arrangements support the case. Hence, sovereignty concerns and conflicting national 
interests is also a factor of internationalization of CLP (Guzman, 2001 and 2004; 
Fox, 2000). 
Differences between countries cause them to take part in different and various 
forms of internationalization arrangements. Differing conceptions on objectives of 
CLP affect the internationalization levels of countries (Fox, 2000; Stephan, 2005; 
Crane, 2009). Moreover, as it was shown in Chapter two, developed countries 
usually get involved in cooperation and convergence arrangements with other 
developed countries. Hence, as Martin (2008) argues, economic development levels 
are important.  
The role of the EU-U.S. relationship is also important since they are the 
major economic powers and have two of the most developed antitrust regimes in the 
world. Therefore, cooperation, convergence arrangements and/or differences and 
 60 
conflicts between these two countries affect the worldwide process of 
internationalization of CLP (Gerber, 1999). Moreover, the EU and the U.S. compete 
with each other to expand their own antitrust systems to other countries that do not 
have CLP (Fox, 2000).  
Although there are not many findings and studies on the role of non-state 
actors (firms, business organizations etc.) on internationalization of CLP, since the 
antitrust law and policy mainly deals with business practices, I think that this factor 
should also be analyzed in this study. Below the above-mentioned factors are 
discussed in detail.  
 
 
4.2.1. Globalization 
 
Although it has been frequently used in daily life in different concepts, what 
people understand from globalization differ significantly from each other. 
Concerning the economic realm, globalization usually refers to 
“internationalization”, which is an “increase in the volume of economic flows across 
borders” and/or liberalization in terms of removal of trade or investment barriers 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 384). On the other hand, ideas, knowledge and culture 
that flow regardless of the territories and westernization are also regarded as 
globalization in some different concepts (O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 384). Hence, 
it is appropriate to say that globalization is “a multidimensional concept” and a 
process “whereby the barriers of time and space are reduced, new social relations 
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between distant people are fostered and new centers of authority are created” 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 132-133). 
O’Brien and Williams argue that globalization is a historical process 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 9). After the 1850s, international economy was formed 
and economies have become “increasingly global” and from the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, the term global economy was started to be used extensively 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 132). Following this argument, in this study, it is 
assumed that the globalization (in its ‘modern’ form) has been an ongoing process 
from the 1850s, but has become a real phenomenon in the last two or three decades.   
Within this framework, the following paragraphs will explain the relevance of 
globalization with the internationalization of CLP. As described earlier, the CLP 
deals mainly with cartels, monopolization or abuse of dominance by firms and 
mergers. These three areas have been all affected by the internationalization of 
economic activity or economic globalization since all these antitrust matters started 
to transcend national boundaries. 
With the internationalization of business activities, firms that only had 
national competitors faced many rivals from different nations. Thus, they had to 
increase their shares in international markets. For this reason, some firms started to 
engage in anti-competitive activities to resist globalization and competition.  
Consequently, internationalization of anticompetitive activity led to the 
internationalization of CLP. Dabbah (2003: 14) argues that internationalization of 
antitrust law and policy is a “response to market globalization” because, with 
globalization, it became almost inevitable to make changes in antitrust policy. For 
 62 
example, Commissioners for the Competition Directorate General at the European 
Commission, Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert (1996: 3) argued that: 
[Liberalization and globalization] call into question the domestic 
nature of competition rules and the absence of binding rules at the 
international level. Many countries or regions have implemented 
comprehensive policies, but lack appropriate instruments to apply 
domestic competition rules to anticompetitive practices with an 
international dimension, as well as to obtain relevant information 
outside the jurisdiction. A framework is necessary then to enhance 
effective enforcement of competition rules. 
 
Similarly, although failed, the idea behind the inclusion of competition rules to 
the WTO regime was to eliminate private business constraints, which adversely 
affected the liberalized trade environment. Hence, international competition rules 
were seen as a response to the anticompetitive behavior of firms within the context of 
globalization process. 
Furthermore, it is argued that one of the main factors that necessitated a 
network such as the International Competition Network was economic globalization: 
[E]conomic globalization has resulted in an increasing number of 
investigations of mergers, cartels, and abuses of dominance that 
transgress jurisdictional boundaries. This involves two risks, that of 
sub-optimal enforcement, if agencies which each have a partial picture 
of the situation do not cooperate with each other, and that of divergent 
outcomes, if different jurisdictions reach different conclusions about 
the same practice (ICN, 2005: 1-2). 
 
To sum up, globalization process is a factor of internationalization of 
anticompetitive business conduct that has necessitated internationalization of CLP. 
The three different areas of antitrust, accordingly, (i) anticompetitive 
arrangements/cartels, (ii) abuse of dominance/monopolization and (iii) mergers, are 
analyzed below. 
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(i) Anticompetitive Arrangements/Cartels 
Cartels are the oldest form of business activity that fall in the scope of 
antitrust regulation. According to Wells (2002: 5), cartels started to be seen in their 
modern format from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There were national 
cartels in which firms from same country came together to resist foreign competition 
and also there were international cartels since businesses across borders usually 
“decided to cooperate rather than engage in costly and quite likely inconclusive 
economic wars” (Wells, 2002: 5).  
Before the beginning of the WW1, there had been international cartels in 
important sectors such as steel rail, explosive and synthetic alkali (Wells, 2002: 5). 
During the protection years of 1920s and 1930s, exporting firms continued to engage 
in anticompetitive arrangements (with national and cross-national firms) to be able to 
decrease the costs of contracting foreign markets. Despite the protectionist measures 
of the years followed by the WW1 and the Great Depression, international cartel 
activity has continued. In the interwar period, there had been 179 detected 
international cartels (Connor, 2004: 242). 
Thus, the expansion of markets and its relative speed in the second phase of 
industrial revolution and the emergence of international cartel activity in the last 
quarter of the 19th century closely follow each other. In fact, the earliest effort for the 
introduction of multilateral antitrust rules was the League of Nations’ World 
Economic Forum in 1927, which was a failure.  
In the late 1980s and in 1990s, as Simmons and Elkins (2003: 275) argue, 
there were three main policies that intensified globalization process: (i) liberalization 
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of the current account, (ii) liberalization of the capital account and (iii) the 
unification of exchange rate. Moreover, deregulation and/or privatization of national 
monopolies along with liberalization and technological advancement have also been 
drivers of the process.  
Within this framework, Sweeney (2010: 79) claims that with the growth of 
economic globalization, it is likely that the level of harm caused by international 
cartels shall increase, “both in absolute terms and relative to harm caused by 
domestic cartels”. According to a study by Connor (2004), it was found that between 
the years 1996-2001, there were 167 hardcore cartels prosecuted by the U.S., the EU 
and Canada. Between 1969 and 1995 (total of 26 years), 33 international cartels were 
discovered by the EU while this number is 24 between 1996 and 2001 (total of 5 
years).  
The harm of international cartels is hard to quantify but this is usually 
estimated by finding the percentage and/or amount of price increases caused by 
cartels.  In a report by the OECD Competition Committee (2002: Annex A), it was 
concluded that: 
[R]ecent cases against large, international cartels suggest that the 
dimensions of the problem are even larger than previously thought. 
It remains difficult to place a monetary value on the harm, but it is 
surely significant, amounting to billions of dollars annually. 
 
Similarly, Connor and Lande (2005) studied the price overcharges resulting 
from international cartels and demonstrated that the median overcharge for 
international cartels has been 30-33% between 1780 and 2004 and 25% between 
1991 and 2004.  
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Moreover, the effect of international cartels on the trade levels of developing 
countries was estimated by Levenstein and Suslow (2004). For their cross-section 
analysis, they used a sample of 42 prosecuted hardcore cartel cases during the 1990s.  
It was found that “the average annual amount of trade affected during the 1990s (…) 
was $47.0 billion, representing 4.7 percent of imports and 0.9 percent of GDP of 
these countries (Levenstein and Suslow, 2004: 817-818).  
Another study by Evenett et al. (2001) demonstrated that the average time 
periods that international cartels operated has been rather long: at least 6 years in 
1990s. The reason behind the operability of international cartels could be their ability 
to escape from cartel prosecution more easily than domestic cartels since cartel 
members may be more loyal to the cartel activity to enjoy huge international profits 
and since the international nature of cartels enable members to find more 
sophisticated anti-detection and anti-cheating techniques (Sweeney, 2010: 86-87). 
Accordingly, Sweeney argues that it is the spreading of cartel culture all around the 
world and distortion of international trade that will make “everyone worse off” 
(Sweeney, 2010: 82). 
 
(ii) Abuse of Dominance/Monopolization 
The other area that competition policy deals with is the abuse of dominance 
or monopolization. The internationalization of national markets is claimed to 
increase the competition in markets by decreasing the market power of dominant 
firms. On the other hand, global markets offer dominant firms to extend the reach of 
their activities and hence, their market power internationally. This could occur in two 
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ways. First, although a dominant firm may conduct its anticompetitive activity in a 
domestic market, its negative effects can be felt in some other markets. Second, a 
firm may be dominant in more than one jurisdiction and engage in monopolization 
activity in all of those markets. Budzinski (2008: 18) argues that anticompetitive 
behaviors of dominant firms in international markets are more frequent in recent 
decades.  
One of the striking examples of companies with global market 
power/dominance is Microsoft. Microsoft is often referred as a case for taking the 
advantage of market liberalization and technological advancement. With a world 
market share of over 90% and dominance in many national markets, Microsoft was 
investigated in various antitrust cases by the U.S, the EU and certain other 
jurisdictions.   
When a multinational firm is investigated by more than one competition 
authority, it may not be possible to reach an efficient solution mainly because of 
diverging decisions. Moreover, when remedies of the most interventionist national 
regulator have to be applied by the dominant firm, the decision of this authority may 
have consequences in other countries whose competition authorities are less 
restrictive. The decision or remedy given by the most restrictive jurisdiction may not 
be the optimal solution for that specific firm’s monopolization case. Furthermore, 
global dominant firms may try to use nationalistic elements to be able to decrease the 
intervention they are exposed in foreign countries, mainly by whipping up political 
support from their home countries (Sweeney, 2010: 139). This increases the 
possibility of conflict between those countries’ regulators/governments.  
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Hence, the internationalization of economic activity may result in the 
extension of dominant firms’ market powers and the possibility of abusive behavior 
worldwide. Moreover, investigations and decisions of different antitrust regulators 
may come up against each other, which creates an environment for conflict. 
 
(iii)Mergers 
The amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased significantly in 
the last two decades. Moreover, the share of M&A activity in total FDI flows has 
also been considerable. Graph 1 below shows the amount of FDI flows by years. 
Graph 2, on the other hand, gives the share of M&A activities in total FDI flows. 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD FDI statistics database (http://stats.unctad.org/fdi) 
Figure 1 Total Flows of FDI by Year (US Dollars at Current Prices) 
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Source: UNCTAD FDI statistics database (http://stats.unctad.org/fdi) 
Figure 2: Share of M&A Activity in Total FDI Flows (%) 
 
International mergers can both have procompetitive and anticompetitive 
effects. They are procompetitive because national markets with powerful firms open 
up to competition from abroad when an international competitor buys a domestic 
business. Markets enlarge and people have more choices that are both cheaper and 
more qualified. On the other hand, by merging with different business from all over 
the world, a firm can also gain market dominance over time, which may restrain 
competition and decrease consumer welfare in a market. This situation in return, may 
cause powerful businesses to abuse their positions in international markets in the 
longer term. Merger activities that have a transnational nature create additional costs 
to merging parties since they have to apply various jurisdictions for pre-merger 
reviews.  
To sum up, it is shown above that the globalization process is an important 
factor in internationalization of CLP because (i) anticompetitive 
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arrangements/cartels, (ii) abuse of dominance/monopolization and (iii) mergers have 
raised important governance issues within the context of globalization process.  
However, despite a relationship between globalization and an increase in 
international anticompetitive activity, globalization process alone cannot explain the 
internationalization of CLP. There are reasons for arguing globalization is not the 
only factor in internationalization of CLP. First, despite globalization and 
internationalization of anticompetitive business activities, national competition 
authorities could unilaterally tackle with such problems, especially with their tool of 
extraterritorial application. Yet, there have also been cooperation and convergence 
mechanisms issued by states/regulators, which make one think that there are other 
important factors in internationalization of antitrust law and policy. Second, and 
more importantly, there are different levels and forms of internationalization in CLP. 
Bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts with differing cooperation and 
convergence structures have also emerged during the process. Hence, due to the 
scattered and complex structure of internationalization of CLP, it is thought that there 
are other factors of internationalization to be discussed. 
 
 
4.2.2. Sovereignty and Conflicting National Interests  
 
Today, most of the countries in the world (except the EU member countries) 
have the competence for applying their domestic antitrust laws and policies on 
conduct that take place in their own territories. Hence, domestic regulators have the 
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power of enforcement and decision-making in CLP issues. Consequently, states do 
not prefer losing this power, since it is seen as a limitation to their sovereignty.  
Furthermore, the existing national/regional regulatory arrangements aim at 
increasing or at least protecting national welfare and therefore states are bound to 
focus on their citizens’ welfare instead of global welfare (Budzinski, 2008: 32). This 
is actually in line with the argument that “governments and regulators favor their 
own constituents over foreigners” (Guzman, 2001: 1152). The export cartel 
exemption given by the U.S. to domestic export firms that are in a cartelistic 
behavior in foreign markets is an important example of this. Export cartels are 
exempted from national antitrust laws, despite their nature being national. This is 
because the U.S. citizens are not affected from export cartels, while these domestic 
firms gain considerable profits. However, citizens’ of the countries who import the 
goods and/or services of the cartel members lose in this situation.  
The argument that national welfare is preferred at the expense of world 
welfare is supported by decisions or statements of different regulators for the same 
transaction. For instance, the EU’s opposition to the famous Boeing/McDonnell 
merger in 1997 is seen as a support for Airbus (a European firm and the Boeing’s 
only competitor) against Boeing (the U.S. firm), while U.S.’s clearance of the 
transaction is regarded as a support for Boeing.  
Countries’ tendency to protect their own sovereignty and national interests 
affect the process of internationalization of CLP in two different ways. First, 
extraterritorial application of domestic laws and policies become problematic since 
this is seen as a threat to a nation’s sovereignty and opposed to its national interests. 
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Second, harmonization, binding international codes and supranationalization of CLP 
create problems because states want to hold the power of implementation and 
decision-making on competition issues and see such attempts threatening their 
sovereignty. Below, these arguments are discussed in detail.  
 
 
4.2.2.1. The Issue of Extraterritoriality and Sovereignty  
 
Extraterritoriality is defined as a “state’s claim of jurisdiction over 
individuals or activities beyond its borders” (Gayton: 1997:3) and it is an attempt to 
“unilaterally internalize the negative external effects” (Budzinski, 2008: 34). On the 
other hand, the principle of territoriality asserts that nations are not allowed to apply 
their laws to foreign jurisdictions. However, in the Lotus case in 1927, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice defined an exception to this principle and stated that:  
Far from laying a general prohibition to the effect that states may 
not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of (…) 
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of 
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive 
rules (Zanettin, 2002: 21).  
 
After the Lotus decision, the U.S. became the first jurisdiction that applied 
this exception in an antitrust case, Alcoa, in 1945. According to Gayton (1997: 5), 
the U.S.’s extraterritorial application of its laws is an attempt that expands and as 
well as undermines the notion of territoriality. 
  The instrument used by the U.S. for extraterritorial application was the effects 
doctrine. According to the effects doctrine, domestic competition agencies apply 
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their domestic laws to anticompetitive practices, which occur in foreign markets and 
have a significant anticompetitive impact on domestic markets.  
Extraterritorial application of domestic laws has its own shortcomings since 
unilateral enforcement of national rules is difficult in order to deal with international 
problems. The main problem with the extraterritoriality is the confliction of national 
interests due to sovereignty concerns.  
Within this framework, the doctrine of sovereignty is one of the pillars on 
which the internationalization of antitrust policy stands. Because the extent of 
countries’ wills to relinquish their sovereignty is an important question in the 
internationalization process (Dabbah: 2003: 139). Since national laws and policies 
apply inside national boundaries, states feel threatened when another country 
attempts to apply its rules in their own territories.  
As the U.S. started to expand the application of the effects doctrine, the 
countries such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom started to 
response by enacting “blocking statutes” to exclude their citizens and companies 
from the extraterritorial application of the U.S. law (Gayton, 1997: 5) because they 
regarded it “as tantamount to a legal invasion” (Slaughter and Zaring, 1997: 4). 
The potential for conflict even increases when  a country applies its domestic 
law against a conduct in a foreign market, in which such a conduct is not lawful or is 
even desirable (Mitschke, 2008: 23). For example, a case was brought against Swiss 
watch manufacturers by the U.S. since there was a claim that by an agreement they 
signed, watch manufacturers had stopped the exportation of watch spare parts to 
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prevent manufacture of watches in other parts of the world. However, the problem 
was that the agreement, which was interpreted as anticompetitive by the U.S., had 
been known and even supported by the Swiss government (Zanettin, 2002: 35). 
Extraterritorial application has some other shortcomings. First, some states do 
not have national CLP systems and some do not have the capability to apply their 
laws and policies extraterritorially. Countries without economic and political power 
do not have the ability for extraterritorial application of their domestic laws and 
policies (Mitschke, 2008: 22). It is observed that regulators of only developed 
countries such as Germany, Japan and the EC, have applied extraterritoriality 
principle effectively. Hence these less powerful countries have difficulty in 
protecting their national interests concerning the international anticompetitive 
activity affecting their territories.  
Another shortcoming of the extraterritorial enforcement is the inability to 
collect information to evaluate the potential anticompetitive activity if the 
information needed is in strict control of foreign country. Usually, national 
competition authorities have extensive investigation powers that are based on state 
power. However, when the evidence is abroad, it is not possible to apply those 
powers in foreign jurisdictions (Budzinski, 2008: 37). There are two main options in 
such a situation: to ask the foreign competition authority to send the information or 
to demand the firm to send the relevant documents on a voluntary basis. The first 
option is hard to realize, since national regulators are usually reluctant to send such 
information. The problem with the second option is the probability of insufficient 
evidence due to the fact that firms may not send the documents, which are against 
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their cases. Therefore, the existence of necessary information abroad has the 
potential to deteriorate the investigation process because of countries’ and firms’ 
protection of their own interests. (Budzinski, 2008: 37). 
 
 
4.2.2.2. The Issue of Supranationalization and Sovereignty 
 
While sovereignty is an important factor in extraterritorial application of 
domestic laws and policies, it is also limiting the efforts of harmonization, signing a 
binding code and/or supranationalization of CLP. Since harmonization means 
bringing national laws in line with each other, signing an international code means 
adhering to international rules and supranationalization means transfer of rights and 
powers from state-level to supranational level, states/regulators do not want to give 
up their sovereignty and power on implementation of antitrust policies.  
The failed attempt of a binding international arrangement under the auspices 
of the WTO, especially the U.S.’s unwillingness and opposition, is a good example 
of countries’ concerns on sovereignty. Moreover, increasing number of cooperation 
and convergence efforts instead of creating binding international rules on antitrust is 
also supportive of this argument. Even the EU, once a proponent of an international 
antitrust regime under the auspices of the WTO, started to support the form of 
internationalization, which included voluntary and non-binding provisions, such as 
the ICN.  
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Overall, sovereignty concerns and national interests appear to be important 
factors in internationalization of CLP  
 
 
4.2.3. Differences between Countries 
 
Differences among countries play a role in internationalization of antitrust 
law and policy. The main differences that are important in the process are the 
differences in (i) economic structures/development levels, (ii) differences in 
economic integration levels and (iii) differences in competition cultures/institutional 
capabilities. Throughout this section, these differences will be analyzed altogether 
because of their entangled structure: generally, similar economic structures also 
result in similar competition/institutional/policy-making culture or countries with 
similar development levels and competition/institutional cultures are the ones that are 
usually more integrated in economic sense. 
Differences in market structures and economic environments between 
developing and developed countries can be a factor affecting the level of 
internationalization of CLP. Bradford (2007: 419) argues that optimal antitrust rules 
and therefore the preferred type of international antitrust arrangement for developing 
and developed countries may differ because of “differences in the composition of the 
domestic market, the degree of trade liberalization, the institutional ability to pursue 
antitrust violations as well as domestic interest group dynamics”. 
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Despite major differences among developing or developed countries, there 
are “a set of interests specific to developing countries” in the world trading system 
(O’Brein and Williams, 2007: 160) and similar agendas concerning their economic 
development objectives. This is most clearly seen in the negotiation process for a 
competition code under the UNCTAD. Actually, the inspiration of the developing 
countries in dealing with CLP under the auspices of UNCTAD was the aim of 
economic development of the less developed countries (Lianos, 2007:4). 
Negotiations for a code on restrictive business practices under the UNCTAD 
and the resulting Set reflect developing countries’ economic development goals 
while the developed nations insisted on the maintenance of market competition and 
promotion of antitrust rules (Oesterle, 1981: 20).  
During the negotiations, developing countries argued that there should have 
been an emphasis on their ‘special situation’ and that a business practice that has an 
effect on trade and economic development’ should be defined as a restrictive 
practice. (Oesterle, 1980:17-19). On the other hand, developed countries insisted that 
‘adverse effect on trade and development’ alone shall not mean that the business 
practice would be restrictive.  
Other than the coverage of restrictive business practices, developing countries 
argued that there should be an exemption for firms of developing countries and the 
Set should concentrate on the conduct of multinational companies from developed 
countries. Nevertheless, given the opposition of developed countries to this 
argument, in Article B (7), the principles and rules of the Set was designed to be 
universally applicable to all countries and enterprises regardless of the parties 
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involved in the transactions, acts or behavior. On the other hand, Article C(7), which 
is about the preferential treatment to developing countries, states that the developed 
countries should take into account in their control of restrictive business practices   
the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries. Moreover along 
the text, there is an emphasis on principles to be applied in a just and equitable basis. 
As a result, because of different economic structures and conflicting interests 
of developed and developing nations, the Set reflected neither the sole economic 
development goals of developing world nor the consumer welfare approach of the 
developed world.  
The argument that the developed countries tend to cooperate with developed 
countries while they refrain signing agreements with the developing world is 
supported by current state of bilateral agreements between different competition 
authorities: “[T]here are few agreements between developed and developing 
countries or between large and small countries” (Jenny, 2003: 5). 
In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) has nine 
bilateral agreements with nine mostly developed and/or large economies. These are 
Australia (1982), Brazil (1999), Canada (1995), Germany (1976), European 
Communities (1991), Israel (1999), Japan (1999), Mexico (2000) and Russia (2009). 
Among these nine economies, in 2008, six of them had per capita incomes higher 
than $25.000 while four of them had incomes higher than $35.00013. 
                                                 
13 Australia: $37.250, Canada: $38.710, Germany: $35.950, The European Communities: $32.600, 
Israel: $27.450 and Japan: $35.190. Source: The World Bank and the CIA Factbook (for the data of 
the European Communities) 
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When the texts of these agreements are analyzed, it is seen that only the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed with Russia consists of technical cooperation 
issues such as training courses, comments on each others’ proposed change of laws 
and assistance on promotion of sound competition policy.14 On the other hand, the 
agreements with, for example, Australia and Canada include detailed provisions on 
exchange of evidence and on further elaboration of the principles of positive comity, 
respectively.   
Zanettin (2002: 68-71) argues that the opening of web of bilateral agreements 
to developing countries such as Israel, Brazil and Mexico can be explained by these 
countries’ ‘special’ relationships and their amount of trade with the U.S. Brazil is one 
of the most powerful economies of the Americas and an important trading partner, 
Israel has a free trade zone agreement with the U.S. and Mexico is a member of 
NAFTA (Zanettin, 2002: 69).  
Despite the importance of similar economic structures for cooperation and 
convergence between countries, the degree of bilateral cooperation between 
competition agencies of developing countries with similar development level has 
been limited (Botta 2009). Botta (2009) analyzes the bilateral cooperation efforts 
between Brazil and Argentina and finds that even though there is a substantial degree 
of economic integration between these countries, as they are one of the leading trade 
partners of each other and signatories of Mercosur, a regional trade agreement, they 
have not been successful in cooperating with each other on antitrust matters (Botta, 
                                                 
14 “Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust Cooperation Between The United States Department 
oj Justice and The United States Federal Trade Commission, On the One Hand, and The Russian 
Federal Anti-Monoploy Service, On the Other Hand”, November, 10,2009. Available at 
www.usdoj.gov  
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2009: 154-156). Based on interviews with the officers and commissioners from the 
Brazilian and Argentinean competition authorities, it is seen that one major reason is 
the “different stages of development of the competition law in two countries and the 
lack of personal contacts” (Botta, 2009:154-157). 
On the other hand, Patricia Agra, an adviser of the President of the Brazilian 
competition authority, claims that a certain degree of confidence to each other’s 
jurisdictions is necessary for bilateral cooperation to work and such a confidence is 
lacking between Brazil and Argentina (Botta, 2009: 172). Moreover, the reason for 
the lack of trust from the Brazilian perspective is because of the independence 
problem of the Argentinean competition authority that causes its decisions to be 
influenced from the political considerations. Thus, despite having similar 
development levels and some degree of economic integration, different levels of 
institutional ability and competition culture may result in limited internationalization 
of CLP.  
The argument that the internationalization of CLP could be easier when 
countries have similar competition laws and institutional/policy-making cultures can 
be supported by the documents provided by the national agencies and by the existing 
convergence and cooperation mechanisms. For example Acting Assistant Attorney 
General of the U.S. Department of Justice, Klein (1996) presented the bilateral 
agreements of the U.S. with other jurisdictions as being “between and among 
countries that have well-established commitments to, and experience in, competition 
matters”. Klein (1996) argued that international antitrust agenda can be successful as 
long as it is among key trading partners with common policies on antitrust.  
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Shared values and norms are important in this field, since CLP is not a “set of 
neutral principles” that all nations agree, but it is a policy area in which ”dearly held  
public values” are important (Waller, 1997: 348). Waller argues that this is why 
national differences among competition cultures are the most important obstacle in 
harmonization efforts and the future of international antitrust (Waller, 1997: 348). 
The most advanced bilateral agreement that includes provisions on 
cooperation and harmonization in antitrust today is between Australia and New 
Zealand.  This agreement allows parties to extend their legislative prohibitions to 
cover both jurisdictions. Taylor (2006: 120) asserts that these two countries have 
similar legal systems, highly harmonized competition laws and this agreement was 
part of a larger harmonization attempt of both parties’ business laws. Consequently, 
this case demonstrates that the similarity of rules and competition/institutional 
culture has been an important factor for extending the cooperation and convergence 
provisions in bilateral arrangements. 
Similarly, Zanettin (2002: 229-230) argues that bilateral cooperation can be 
used efficiently only by limited number of countries since good knowledge of other 
party’s legislation, its commitment to antitrust principles and trust between the 
parties are essential factors for an efficient cooperation. The U.S., the EU, Canada, 
Australia and Japan are among the countries that have the potential to develop such a 
relationship (Zanettin, 2002: 230).  
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4.2.4. Role of the Relationship between the EU and the U.S. 
 
The EU and the U.S. constitute together more than %50 of the world’s total 
GDP. Moreover according to World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2008), 40 out of 
top 50 financial transnational corporations are from the U.S. or the EU, while again 
the same percentage holds for non-financial companies.  Therefore, it is meaningful 
to say that competition policies of the two and relationship between them would have 
a substantial effect for the rest of the world. Similarly, Chairman of the U.S.’ Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), William Kovacic (2008: 8) claims that: 
 More than any other single force, the interaction of the competition 
policy systems of the EU and United States deeply influences the 
convergence process within all of the multinational and regional 
networks. 
 
The EU and the U.S. are determined to apply competition laws and see CLP as 
a part of their economic policies for growth and development. Baring in mind that 
the U.S. antitrust law influenced the founders of the EU, this is no surprising. 
Nevertheless, despite U.S. antitrust influence, the EU competition law has features 
that are uniquely European (Sweeney, 2010: 182). Moreover, there are also 
differences in enforcement of these policies: the EU seems to be more interventionist 
than the U.S.  
As world’s most powerful economies, it is very common that the U.S. and the 
EU deal with same competition cases such as transnational mergers, international 
cartels or abuse of dominance by large multinational firms. Thus, the probability of 
conflict caused by different decisions reached by these two jurisdictions and 
procedural differences also impose costs on firms under investigation.  
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The cooperation and convergence efforts between the EU and the U.S. have 
continued for several years. The bilateral cooperation agreement between the 
Commission on the one hand and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) 
and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (two regulator antitrust institutions in the 
U.S.) on the other has positive comity and information sharing elements in it. 
Moreover, they also cooperate in other multilateral arrangements such as the OECD 
and the ICN. On the other hand, there had been a main divergence between two 
jurisdictions on the inclusion of competition policy issue on the agenda of the WTO:  
The EU was the main supporter of a multilateral binding competition regime under 
the auspices of the WTO, while the U.S. relied on non-binding bilateral cooperation 
arrangements15.  
Despite sharing similar views and cooperating in many ways, there have been 
cases that have raised questions about the ongoing differences and need to improve 
cooperation and convergence between the EU and the U.S. For example, the 
European Commission prohibited the merger of two American companies, GE and 
Honeywell, which were producers of jet engines and aerospace products. 
Respectively, this was a transaction that the U.S. authorities cleared by claiming that 
it would make the customers/consumers better off. Another example is the Microsoft 
cases on abuse of dominance/monopolization. The U.S. and the Microsoft agreed on 
settlement agreements (one in 1994 and other in 2001), after the investigations run 
by American regulators during the 1990s. However, the decision of the European 
                                                 
15 Damro (2004 :7) argues that “the U.S. has the tools of unilateralism, they fear the compromise of 
bargaining, and they abjure the ‘relinquishment’ of sovereignty”. On the other hand the power of the 
Commission would only grow due to its “own experience with binding, treaty-based harmonization of 
competition law in the Single Market” (Damro,2004: 8). 
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Commission after the similar investigation procedures was fining Microsoft $612 
million in 2004. In brief, there are still conflicts between the two of world’s major 
antitrust systems, which devalue the efforts on internationalization of CLP 
Another point that should be emphasized concerning the EU and the U.S. 
competition laws is that in the face of proliferation of national competition laws all 
around the world, the EU and U.S.’s CLP regimes become models for new 
jurisdictions. While there were only 20 countries that had competition laws in the 
early 1980s (Sweeney, 2010: 2), today more than 100 jurisdictions apply antitrust 
laws and policies. Hence, the technical assistance and capacity-building efforts 
supported by these two jurisdictions are important factors shaping the antitrust 
systems of developing countries.  
Kovacic (2009: 316) points that there is a competition between the EU and the 
U.S. competition agencies for “influence and recognition”; a competition to be “the 
global leader in competition policy”. Furthermore, there are arguments about the EU 
winning this competition because more nations are finding the EU antitrust system 
more suitable to their economies and policies than the US system and adopt a model 
that resembles the EU CLP regime (Fox, 2000: 1798; Kovacic, 2008: 8-9). 
Consequently, the nature of relations (differences, similarities, conflicts and 
cooperation) between the U.S. and the EU antitrust policies is an important factor for 
the internationalization of CLP. In fact, many people think that as long as the EU and 
the U.S. CLP have huge substantial differences and no agreement, further steps, such 
as a multilateral agreement, cannot be taken in the internationalization process 
(Damro, 2004: 3, Sweeney, 2010: 179). 
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4.2.5. Non-State Actors 
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs), business interest groups and other non-
governmental organizations such as consumer interest groups, bar associations, 
group of advisers etc. should also be considered in the process of internationalization 
of CLP. These non-state actors can affect the process of internationalization of CLP 
in two distinct ways: domestic and international. Concerning the domestic way, non-
state actors may have a role in the shaping a country’s position on 
internationalization antitrust and of related talks and negotiations with other 
countries.  Moreover, non-state actors can also be members of international 
organizations that deal with international competition policy and they may affect the 
international agenda directly by participating in the meetings of such institutions.  
Most of the institutions that deal with multilateral antitrust arrangements 
recognize non-state actors as participants (Blumenthal, 2004: 277). For instance, the 
OECD reserves a place for the private sector participants especially the Business 
Advisory Committee (BIAC) but holds the right to exclude them from the meetings 
(Blumenthal, 2004: 277). Concerning the WTO, participation is more limited to 
“advocacy and discussion with their respective governments” (Blumenthal, 2004: 
277). 
The ICN can be regarded as the most ‘open’ international organization to the 
non-state actor participation.  
ICN agency members work closely with non-governmental experts, 
including private practitioners, representatives of international 
organizations, industry and consumer groups, and academics 
(“non-governmental advisors” or “NGAs”). This structure 
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promotes the interplay of public and private sector participation 
and expertise in the development of the ICN’s projects, resulting in 
a work product that benefits from the input of a wide spectrum of 
stakeholders16. 
 
Non-state actors’ participation to the ICN becomes in two ways: directly taking 
place in projects, alongside member agencies or working through their member 
agencies. They are especially helpful in identifying the problems of the business 
community, commenting on the work products or directly drafting a work product 
themselves. Yet, the “ultimate say (…) with respect to ICN principles, practices, 
recommendations, and other outputs is limited to member agencies” (Blumenthal, 
2004: 277). Furthermore, only member agency representatives can be the members 
of the steering committee, leaders in working groups and designer of the projects 
(Blumenthal, 2004: 277).  Actually, the fact that the non-governmental organizations 
should contact the member agency of its jurisdiction to be able to get involved in 
ICN working groups rather than applying directly to the ICN shows that non-state 
actors are not seen as the main stakeholders but as  ‘by-products’ of their respective 
jurisdictions.  
The role of MNCs deserves a special attention since globalized activities of 
firms are seen as the main drive for the internationalization of CLP and at the same 
time business community also participates in the process itself. There are people who 
argue that MNCs should be seen as part of the problem rather than the solution when 
considering the question of internationalization of competition law because it is the 
                                                 
16 Non-Governmental Advisors to the International Competition Network,. ICN. Retrieved June 12, 
2010 from www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/non-
governmental%20advisors%20to%20the%20international%20competition%20network.pdf.  
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anticompetitive or restrictive practices of business firms that the whole issue of 
internationalization actually arises (Dabbah, 2006).  
There has been an increase in the international cartel and transnational merger 
activities throughout the globalization process. Yet the question arises how the 
business community responds to the internationalization of antitrust policy. 
To answer the question, one should examine the behavioral motives of firms. 
It is generally assumed that the main aim of a rational firm is to maximize its profits. 
Therefore, it should seek ways to decrease its costs and/or increase its efficiency. 
Under this assumption, while responding to the internationalization of economic 
activity and internationalization of CLP, business world shall try to decrease the 
costs and keep the benefits that arise from using national competition laws while 
dealing with international antitrust problems. 
According to Dabbah (2003b: 211-213), MNCs are assumed to be in support 
of internationalizing competition law because various jurisdictions handling the same 
activity could create inconsistencies among decisions, conflicts between states and 
also there may be a risk of using confidential information of firms  for economic 
espionage. Despite making such an assumption, he states that “at the moment (…), it 
is not yet clear which particular industrial sector or key [MNCs] will support or resist 
the move towards greater internationalization of competition law”.  
Without internationalization of CLP, business community faces transaction 
costs that arise from transnational merger activities. Together with the increasing 
number of new competition laws throughout the world, an MNC may have to apply 
several jurisdictions for one merger transaction it plans. Some sources suggest that 
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there are more than 70 jurisdictions that have a pre-merger notification system in the 
world17 (Galloway, 2009: 179).  
In a study by the International Bar Association (IBA, 2003), it is revealed 
that a typical transnational merger is worth €3.9 billion and notified to six 
antitrust authorities in average, generating a cost of  €3.3 million and taking 
seven months to be completed. Moreover, a study conducted by Richard 
Whish and Diane Wood for the OECD (Whish/Wood Report) (1994: 99) 
found that business people see the executive time and the lost productivity 
resulting from long, protracted investigations as the largest cost of multiple 
reviews. Similarly, Waller (1997: 387) claims that the strongest pressure for a 
EU-style “one-stop shopping” in merger reviews comes from the business 
interests’ lobbying activities since they demand “unified filings and timing 
requirements, more uniform and less burdensome disclosure requirements and 
shorter waiting periods before transactions may close”.  
In sum, the increasing transaction costs is one of the reasons why the 
business community supports the internationalization of antitrust policy. In 
addition to money and time costs of multiple notifications, mergers reviewed 
by many different jurisdictions increase the risk of conflicting and inconsistent 
results. There may be inevitable differences between the results reached by 
distinct authorities, because the market structure and effects of transaction may 
differ among economies (Griffin, 1999: 40). Thus, cooperation and 
                                                 
17 For instance, Exxon-Mobile merger had to be notified to more than twenty jurisdictions while 
MCI/WorldCom merger was reviewed by more than 30 competition authorities (Dabbah, 2003: 
supranote 23). 
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convergence up to some point have the potential to decrease these transaction 
costs burdened by the business.  
Business interests in areas of antitrust other than mergers are more 
diverse (Waller, 1997: 387). Given that internationalization of CLP has 
actually been a result of internationalization of anti-competitive business 
practices, international cartels may take the advantage of national laws being 
implemented in national boundaries. Even when a jurisdiction applies its law 
extraterritorially, difficulties in gathering evidence outside it territory may 
provide cartels the opportunity to get rid of antitrust sanctions. Therefore, an 
anticompetitive company would not support the cooperation efforts at the 
international level.  
Export firms, on the other hand, may find it useful to have harmonized 
antitrust rules because they would like to compete in fair grounds outside their 
jurisdictions. Yet, because of the exemptions given by national authorities to 
export cartels, those cartel members may not support internationalization of 
antitrust with the fear of losing this privilege. 
Putnam (1988) argues that domestic interest groups, by pressuring their 
governments, can be effective in the politics of international negotiations 
accordingly, it could be argued that powerful business sector in a country 
affects the internationalization of CLP through shaping their governments 
and/or antitrust agencies’ preferences. For example, the role of MNCs and 
their lobbying efforts in the WTO negotiations for a TRIPs agreement was 
important since they, as the main patent holders in the world, would clearly 
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benefit from such an arrangement (Bradford, 2007: 434). Nevertheless, as it 
was explained above, the costs and benefits of internationalization of CLP for 
the business world seems to be “diffuse, case-specific and difficult to forecast” 
(Bradford, 2007: 430). Thus there have not been any interest groups lobbying 
for an international antitrust agreement under the auspices of WTO (Bradford, 
2007: 426).  
Furthermore, internationalization is perceived to be carried by the 
governments/agencies for increasing the effective enforcement capabilities of 
the governments/agencies and to increase consumer or social welfare. In such 
a setting, private sector is only seen as a tool that can be used for 
understanding the situation and needs of the market, rather than a player in the 
process of internationalization. The role of non-governmental bodies in the 
OECD or ICN is an example of this situation since non-state/non-agency 
participants are excluded from the main decision-making processes. Therefore, 
it has been observed that despite their increasing participation, private sector is 
still not a powerful actor in internationalization of CLP.  
 
In this chapter, the factors that influence the internationalization process 
of CLP were analyzed. It is concluded that globalization is a factor of 
internationalization of CLP because it led to an increase in international 
anticompetitive business conduct. Moreover, sovereignty concerns matter in 
terms of limiting both extraterritorial application of domestic laws and 
supranationalization of CLP/agreeing on a binding international agreement.  
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Difference in economic development levels, competition policies and 
institutional cultures together with degree economic integration is important in 
the sense that they affect the form of and actors in internationalization efforts. 
The EU-U.S. relationship affects the process of internationalization because 
they are the most influential countries in terms of CLP in the world. Non-state 
actors, on the other hand, are less influential than expected because there are 
no common objectives that they work for.  
In the light of these factors, in the next chapter, I will analyze the EU’s 
CLP since it is one of the major actors in internationalization of CLP and the 
most successful example of supranationalization. Moreover, the role of 
accession process in Turkish CLP together with Turkey’s efforts in the 
internationalization process will be explained. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKISH CLP 
 
 
The EU case deserves a special attention because its CLP is seen as the most 
successful EU policy concerning the level of supranationalization and hence, it could 
provide an example for internationalization of CLP in the world.  
In this chapter, the leading factors in supranationalization of EU CLP will be 
analyzed to assess the relative success of its antitrust regime. Furthermore, the 
factors that led the EU’s CLP to harmonize and supranationalize will be compared 
with the findings of Chapter three. Then, the emphasis on competition rules in the 
acqui and the Turkish accession process to the EU together with its effects on 
Turkish CLP and Turkey’s internationalization efforts will be discussed.  
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5.1. European Union CLP 
 
The competition rules for the EU take place in the Treaty of Rome (the 
Treaty) that was signed in 195718. Actually, by that time, European states had just 
adopted antitrust laws: France in 1953 and Germany in 1957. Moreover, antitrust law 
and policy field was seen as a highly limited and technical domain where some small 
number of insignificant decisions were made (Moravscik, 1998: 76). Hence, it was 
not seen as a threat to national identity and interests (Büthe and Swank, 2007: 18). 
Moreover, transferring national powers in CLP to supranational level was favored by 
Germany since a European-wide antitrust policy was seen in the interests of big 
German business, which had had fear of facing nationalistic behavior in other 
European countries (Büthe and Swank, 2007: 18). Since Germany promoted a 
competition policy “modeled on its own” and “succeeded imposing its views”, 
provisions on the Treaty reflected more or less the German system of antitrust 
(Moravscik: 1998: 149, 204).   
Consequently, the main articles that deal with competition in the Treaty are 
Article 85 (renumbered as Article 81 in Treaty on European Union (TEU) and as 101 
in Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and Article 86 
(renumbered as Article 82 in TEU and as 102 in TFEU). Article 85 prohibits 
agreements between undertakings that have the object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition and that may affect trade between Member 
                                                 
18 Before that, with the encouragement of the U.S., there had been establishment of competition laws 
in certain European states such as the U.K., Germany and France. 
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States. Article 86, on the other hand, forbids an undertaking that holds a dominant 
position to abuse its dominance in so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States.  
Regulation 4064/89, as the the first regulation of the EC that required pre-
notification to the Commission of concentrations within its scope, states that mergers 
“which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or 
in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market”. 
Within this framework, both in the objectives and activities of the EC and in 
the competition provisions of the Treaty as well as the Regulation, there is an 
emphasis on the competition in internal market/between member states. Therefore, 
the EU’s CLP differs from other systems in the sense that it also serves as a tool to 
achieve the goal of market integration. Similarly, Waller (1997: 353) argues that the 
EU’s CLP should be analyzed in terms goal of creating the European Common 
Market. 
The institutional framework of the EU is an important factor for analyzing the 
EU antitrust policy. The Commission and the ECJ played a key role in “interpreting 
and enforcing EU antitrust law” (Dabbah, 2003: 91). Below, these institutions are 
analyzed separately.  
 
(i) The European Commission 
Although, a common competition policy for the EU was agreed in 1957, a 
‘truly’ common policy came into force after the serious efforts of the Commission 
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(Damro, 2003: 211). In 1957, not all member states had similar competition laws; 
even some of them did not have any and it was the Commission that pushed for a 
common antitrust policy (Damro, 2003: 211). Moreover, the Commission had the 
idea that the centralized enforcement of competition rules was essential for the 
objectives of the EU (Dabbah, 2003: 92). The authority of the Commission on 
competition policy increased with the initiation of Regulation 17/6219 (Regulation 
17), which gave the Commission the discretion on implementation of Articles 85 and 
8620. Yet, it is considered that the competition policy became “truly” European with 
the introduction of merger review process in 1990. Since then, the Commission 
acquired an actual supranational authority in the field (Damro, 2007: 210-212). 
In the competition policy area, the Commission enjoys broad powers ranging 
from investigating (fact-finding) and punishing (legal evaluation), to infringement of 
competition rules on its own initiative or acting on complaints. Therefore, in 
competition cases the Commission is said to be the “law-maker, policeman, 
investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury” (Jones and Sufrin, 2008: 1146). 
 
(ii) The European Court of Justice 
Another EU institution that affected the development of the EU antitrust 
policy is the ECJ. Dabbah (2003: 93) argues that the ECJ has developed EC antitrust 
law by “advancing the propositions it created over the first two decades following 
1957”. Accordingly, while functioning as an institution which “ensure[s] that the 
                                                 
19 Regulation 17/62, 1962 OJ204. 
20 It is argued that the politicians of the time were not aware of Regulation 17’s potential on giving the 
European Commission ability to act independently (Wilks and Bartle, 2002: 164). 
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Commission keeps within the bounds of its powers and discretions and observes the 
law” (Jones and Sufrin, 2008: 1252), the ECJ tried to enhance the powers of the 
Commission (relative to the powers of the Member States and domestic courts) by 
expansive interpretations to strengthen the EC competition law (Dabbah, 2003: 93-
94). 
 
(iii)National Competition Authorities and National Courts 
A supranational CLP enforced by a supranational institution does not mean 
that the national competition authorities (NCAs) do not have a function in the 
system.  The competition chapter in the Treaty was included into the “national law of 
each EU member state and are, therefore, directly enforceable by each national 
court” (Taylor, 2006: 127). Moreover, with the modernization process of the EU 
competition policy, Regulation 1/2003 introduced a system of ‘shared parallel 
competences between the Commission and the NCAs on the application of 
competition provisions in the Treaty.  
European Competition Network (ECN) was established to increase the 
communication of NCAs with each other and NCAs with the Commission.  The 
ECN facilitates consultation, cooperation, and exchange of confidential and non-
confidential information and promotes the uniform application of the competition 
rules on the part of the Commission, NCAs and national courts (Whish, 2005: 258). 
The basic principle in this system is that a case should be dealt by the 
authority best placed to deal with it. An NCA takes action if the conduct has 
substantial direct actual or foreseeable effects in its territory and it must be able to 
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bring the entire infringement to an end 21(Jones and Sufrin, 2008: 1271). If three or 
more member states are affected from a conduct, then it is Commission that takes 
action. Furthermore, NCAs and national courts may apply national laws for 
controlling mergers that do not fall inside the thresholds of the Community law 
(Korah, 2007: 246). 
On the other hand, the Commission may decide on halting the proceedings of 
an NCA and take that case over itself and NCAs should relieve of their competence 
if the Commission initiates its own proceedings. Moreover, NCAs cannot take 
decisions that would encounter to a decision adopted by the Commission (Whish, 
2005: 260). 
 
Role of Non-State Actors 
There are no findings and/or studies that demonstrate the direct role of non-state 
actors in the negotiation process of competition provisions in the Treaty. 
Nevertheless, non-state actors seem to have a role in actual supranationalization of 
CLP. Although the Treaty gave the Commission supranational power in antitrust, it 
could not use it properly until it realized the boundaries of this power. Together with 
the adoption of Regulation 17, there was another factor that pushed the Commission 
to expand its authority: European private sector.  
By making complaints to the Commission about their competitors in the 
market and by bringing the cases to the ECJ, private firms provided the supranational 
                                                 
21 National courts also have the power to apply Article 81 and Article 82. Moreover if a person is 
harmed by an infringement, then that person has a right to bring that action in a domestic court for 
injunction, for ending the action or for damages for his/her loss.  
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institutions to “move from nominal to actual antitrust enforcement authority” and to 
“develop an expansive competition law doctrine” (Büthe, 2009: 192). In other words, 
non-state actors, which were seeking their own economic interests, utilized the 
Commission’s powers to intervene in the market to prohibit the activities that harmed 
their businesses. Concerning the merger policy, firms were in favor of a one-stop 
shop and fast evaluation of their merger activities and hence supported the 
supranationalization of merger policy.  
Moreover, it is also argued that “sub-national” non-state actors and 
supranational institutions, the Commission and the ECJ, formed a kind of 
“transnational coalition” for expanding the supranational governance structure of the 
EU (Büthe and Swank: 2007).  
 
EU CLP as a Part of the Acqui 
The EU competition policy was made a pre-condition for membership to the 
EU, by making it as a part of the acqui communitaire (Chapter 8), Therefore, it got 
easier to harmonize and supranationalize the CLP because any candidate country has 
to adopt EU competition rules before joining the EU. 
 
To sum up, the EU has a system of supranational competition rules enforced 
by a supranational authority. Moreover, the national competition laws are 
harmonized with the EU law and there is a high degree of cooperation and 
information sharing between the national authorities and between the NCAs and the 
Commission.  
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Several reasons could be given for the development of the CLP system that 
the EU has. First, competition policy was introduced as a part of a broader agenda: 
the main objective was market integration and CLP was used as a tool for achieving 
common internal market. Second, CLP was not seen as a policy field that could 
threaten national identities and interests of states. Furthermore, Germany pushed for 
including antitrust provisions to the Treaty. Third, the Commission and the ECJ were 
the main supporters of the supranationalization of competition policy; hence they 
shaped the EU CLP accordingly. Moreover, with the level of market integration 
reached over the years, it became easier to harmonize national laws, to create a 
system of shared competences and to form a body like the ECN. Fourth, non-state 
actors were also supportive of supranationalization. Last, by making the EU 
competition rules as a part of the acqui, countries already adopt EU antitrust policy 
before membership and expansion of the EU CLP model is succeeded.  
However, the extent to which this system is relevant to the 
internationalization of the CLP in the world is questionable. If the factors of 
internationalization of CLP in Chapter three are compared with the findings of this 
chapter, it is seen that despite some similarities, the main motive for European 
competition policy differs from the factors that leads internationalization of CLP 
worldwide. This is why the EU has succeeded a certain level of supranationalization 
and harmonization on its CLP while there is only limited level of cooperation and 
convergence among countries in the world.  
First, in the EU process, CLP was seen as a tool for achieving a certain 
degree of integration among member economies. When the countries decided on 
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such an arrangement, they had already been ready to give up some of their 
sovereignty on some policy areas. Hence, accepting the Commission as the authority 
for EU-level anticompetitive practices was not very difficult. On the other hand, 
without such an objective and acceptance, states are more reluctant to give up their 
sovereignty in antitrust matters. Furthermore, they are keen on protecting their 
national interests and domestic firms. In such a setting, countries choose to cooperate 
and converge their antitrust systems up to a level without making considerable 
concessions such as harmonization and supranationalization.  
Second, the differences among countries have been important in 
supranationalization and harmonization process of CLP in the EU. The founding 
members of the EU did not differ in their economic levels and new members 
generally had certain levels of economic development together with a degree of 
market integration with other member states. Moreover, economic criteria for 
membership provided the disparities between countries to decrease. Concerning the 
CLP, the presence of competition policy as a chapter in the acquis has been very 
important to create a common competition culture in the EU. Thus, it got easier to 
harmonize national policies of member countries. As market integration and 
competition policy harmonization increased, supranational structure of the EU’s CLP 
strengthened. As it was argued before, differences in economic structures, market 
integration levels and competition cultures are important factors in 
internationalization of CLP and this can be observed in the EU example. 
Third, the role of non-state actors/institutions in the supranationalization of 
the EU is important in the sense that the Commission and the ECJ supported the 
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process. Yet, such strong supranational/transnational actors are not present in 
internationalization of CLP in the world. Although there are international 
organizations, they do not have power, motivation and capability to play a leading 
role in the internationalization process. Moreover, MNCs could take the advantage of 
the existing supranational institutions to realize their own economic interests by 
making the Commission and the ECJ take action against possible anticompetitive 
conduct in the market. Consequently, these institutions realized the limits of their 
power and supranational authorities in CLP and hence, actual supranationalization of 
CLP was succeeded.  
 To sum up, there are different dynamics in supranationalization and 
harmonization process of the EU CLP. Thus, it is thought that the EU CLP is a good 
example for the internationalization of CLP since it shows the limitations and 
potentials in the process. Yet it would not be meaningful to take the EU’s system as a 
model for the worldwide internationalization of CLP.   
 
 
5.2. Turkish CLP 
 
 As it was mentioned before, the presence of competition policy in the acquis 
is important because it helps to create a European culture of competition. 
Furthermore, it is important in the sense that it acts like an anchor for the EU 
candidate countries. Turkey is a country in the accession process with the EU and is 
the only country that signed the Customs Union without EU membership. Its role as 
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an EU candidate, as a developing country and as an actor in international CLP 
system makes Turkey a case worth analyzing. Hence, Turkish CLP and 
internationalization efforts will be explained in the next chapter. 
 
 
5.2.1. The Act on the Protection of Competition and the Turkish Competition 
Authority 
 
Adoption of a competition law named The Act on the Protection of 
Competition No.4054 (TAPC) by the Turkish Parliament and establishment of 
Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) in 1994 was a condition for signing a customs 
union agreement with the EU. Agreement Creating an Association between Turkey 
and the EEC or Ankara Agreement that was signed on December 1, 1964 aimed at 
creation of a customs union between Turkey and the EU. Negotiations for a customs 
union could begin in 1994 and the Association Council adopted a decision22 
(Decision 1/95) on March 6, 1995. 
Decision 1/95 includes provisions on competition law and policy under 
Chapter IV named “Approximation of Laws”. Articles 32, 33 and 34 are replica of 
the Treaty’s Articles 85, 86 and 92.  In Articles 32 and 33, business activities are 
“prohibited as incompatible with the proper functioning of the Customs Union, in so 
far as they may affect trade between the Community and Turkey”. Article 34, on the 
                                                 
22 Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing 
the final phase of the Customs Union (96/142/EC) available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/AB/EUAssociationCouncilDecision195CustomsUnionDecision.pdf  
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other hand, prohibits “any aid granted by Member States of the Community or by 
Turkey through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between the Community and Turkey”. 
Article 39 of the Decision 1/95 requires Turkey to “ensure that its legislation 
in the field of competition rules is made compatible with that of the European 
Community, and is applied effectively”. Moreover it was stated that “before the entry 
into force of the Customs Union, [Turkey shall] establish a competition authority 
which shall apply these rules and principles effectively”.  
After the adoption of TAPC and establishment of TCA, the TCA could only 
be operational after three years, in 1997. Important articles of the TAPC (Article 4, 6 
and 7) are in accordance with the TFEU’s 101st and 102nd articles and Regulation 
4064/89.  
 
 
5.2.2. The EU CLP as an Anchor for Turkish CLP 
 
Turkey began negotiations with the EU to become a full member of the EU 
on October 3, 2005. Among the 35 chapters of the acquis, Chapter 8 is on 
competition policy. This chapter has two sub-heading as “Anti-trust and Mergers” 
and “State Aid”. Screening Report of Chapter 8 was published on May 3, 2006 and 
according to this report, “acquis in this chapter is to a large extent linked to the 
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obligations arising from the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey presently in 
force” (European Commission, 2006). 
In Progress Report 2009 (European Commission, 2009: 49), it is stated that: 
Overall, Turkey shows a high level of alignment in the field of anti-
trust, including its merger control rules. Turkey continued to 
enforce the competition rules effectively. The Competition 
Authority has a satisfactory level of administrative and operational 
independence. No further legal alignment in the area of State aid 
can be reported and the long-awaited state aid law is still pending. 
There is still a need to implement the EU discipline on State aid in 
the steel sector, as part of Turkey’s commitment under the ECSC 
Free Trade Agreement. Alignment in this chapter is not complete. 
 
Consequently, Turkish CLP is in line with the acquis but Chapter on 
Competition Policy is not complete due to the problems on state aid issue. 
 
 
5.2.3. Turkey and the TCA as an Actor in Internationalization of CLP 
 
Customs Union between the EU and Turkey include provisions on 
information exchange and positive comity (Articles 36, 40 and 43).  There have been 
two attempts of the TCA for requesting cooperation and consultation from the EU 
based on these provisions of the Decision 1/95. On May 2004, the TCA asked the 
DG Competition of the Commission for information about a possible cartel 
investigation by the Commission; a cartel that had effects on Turkish territory. It was 
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stated by the DG Competition that the information gathered by the Commission is 
confidential and cannot be given to the TCA23.  
On June 2004, an official request was made to the DG Competition (based on 
the Article 43 of the Decision 1/95) about another cartel that affected Turkish 
markets negatively. According to the positive comity provision in this Article, 
affected party requests the other party to take appropriate measures. Yet, whether the 
notified party shall initiate any proceedings depends on its own consideration. By 
referring to this provision of the Article, DG Competition stated that it does not 
consider running an investigation necessary. Hence, it can be concluded that despite 
having very similar laws and an agreement that includes exchange of information 
and positive comity provisions, the TCA efforts on case-specific cooperation with 
the EU has become unsuccessful so far.  
TCA has also engaged in bilateral arrangements with jurisdictions other than the 
EU. These are mainly in the form of Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs): 
- MOU on Cooperation between the Free Trade Commission of the Republic of 
Korea and the TCA (November 17, 2005) 
- MOU for Enhancing Bilateral Cooperation between the Romanian 
Competition Council and the TCA (December 12, 2005) 
- MOU on Cooperation Between the TCA and the Bulgarian Commission on 
Protection of Competition (December 1, 2007) 
- MOU on Cooperation between the Portuguese Competition Authority and the 
TCA (July 28, 2009) 
                                                 
23 This case will be explained in detail below.  
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- MOU on Cooperation between the Council of Competition of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the TCA (April 28, 2010) 
- MOU on Cooperation  the Authority for Fair Competition and Consumer 
Protection of Mongolia and the TCA (April 28, 2010) 
When the texts are analyzed, it is seen that they include provisions on 
cooperation and exchange of information on general competition issues together with 
exchange of staff and technical assistance. There are no binding provisions and/or 
confidential information exchange. Moreover case-specific cooperation and 
consultation is not mentioned in detail24.  
Turkey also takes part in other CLP-related international settings such as the 
WTO, the OECD, the UNCTAD and the ICN. The TCA seems as an active 
participant in these organizations. For the Working Group of the WTO, the TCA 
prepared an opinion document and supported the inclusion of binding competition 
provisions to the WTO, which are on transparency, equal treatment and restriction of 
hard core international cartels in line with the needs of the developing countries. 
The TCA hosted the 2005 United Nations Conference on the Review of the Set. 
In his opening statement, the TCA President of that time, Mustafa Parlak (2005), 
mentioned the importance of the meeting for increasing communication and 
cooperation between the competition authorities and he stated that “members of the 
international society have to meet on a common basis in some way for actually 
fighting international infringements of competition”.  
                                                 
24 MOU with the Mongolia is rather different form the other ones in the sense that it includes positive 
comity provision and the TCA seems as the provider of technical assistance to Mongolian authority. 
Yet the other MOU s are very much the same of each other  
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In the OECD, the TCA participates meetings on CLP since 1998. Moreover, 
the TCA submits its yearly reports to the OECD, shares Turkish experience on 
specific issues and gives opinions on OECD decisions and recommendations. Turkey 
was also reviewed by the OECD under its Peer Review Program and the Peer 
Review Report (OECD, 2005) was presented on February 18, 2005 in the OECD’s 
Global Competition Forum. According to the Peer Review Report: 
The agency [TCA] has continued to make excellent progress in the 
years since [OECD’s 2002 Report]. It has played a critically 
important role in moving the Turkish economy forward to greater 
reliance on competition-based and consumer-welfare oriented 
market mechanisms. As an agency, it can take justifiable pride in 
its reputation as one of Turkey’s most effective and best 
administered agencies.  
 
It is recommended in the Peer Review Report to “leverage and expand 
the Authority’s reach through international co-operation” by “developing 
cooperation agreements with antitrust agencies in other countries that would 
permit sharing of investigative information”. 
The TCA is a member of the ICN since 2002. It actively participates in 
the activities of working groups to share its experience and contribute to 
outcomes of the work of working groups. In this respect, the TCA held the 
leadership of a project on ‘state monopolies’ under the Unilateral Conduct 
Working Group and also it was the co-chairman (with Brazil) of the 
Competition Policy Implementation Working Group. Moreover, the TCA 
actively contributes to and shares country experience for reports prepared by 
the Working Groups in the ICN. Other than these, the TCA hosted the 9th ICN 
Annual Meeting of 2010, which is the most important occasion of the ICN. For 
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this purpose, the TCA became the member of the Steering Committee for one 
period.  
Other than the above-mentioned international efforts of the TCA, it should also 
be noted that TAPC includes a provision on extraterritoriality. This was emphasized 
in OECD Peer Review Report (2005) as: 
Article 2 of the Competition Act incorporates a basic 
“extraterritorial effects” test, so that anticompetitive conduct 
occurring outside Turkey that affects Turkish markets falls within 
the Act’s prohibitions. In proceedings under the Act, foreign firms 
are treated no differently than domestic firms. The Authority 
recognizes the practical problems associated with obtaining 
information about conduct involving foreign firms and products. 
 
As it was mentioned in the report, despite having the ability to apply its 
law extraterritorially, the TCA has difficulties in gathering evidence from 
foreign firms and sanctioning them. Finding evidence is easier if foreign firms 
have subsidiaries in Turkey but still certain problems on investigations prevail.  
An example of the TCA’s cases on international cartel activity that had 
affected the Turkish territory is discussed below. 
 
Sized Coal Market Case25 
Upon the complaints about sharp price increases in the coal market, the 
TCA started an investigation and found that the sharp increase in domestic 
retail prices had resulted from the systematic increases in the prices of 
imported coal. Since the reason for high prices could have been a price fixing 
agreement/a cartel between foreign firms operating in the Turkish market, the 
                                                 
25 Competition Board decision numbered 06-55/712-202, dated 25.7.2006. 
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TCA wanted to make spot inspections/down-raids to these firms. Nevertheless, 
since they were foreign firms, some of them did not even have an operational 
branch in Turkey. Therefore, inspection/evidence-gathering process could not 
be succeeded properly.  
Other than that, the TCA had to contact those firms’ headquarters in 
order to communicate its investigation decision and investigation report to the 
investigated parties, which is a procedural requisite to finalize an investigation.  
The whole notification process was executed via Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) but many problems were faced since “the communication of official 
documents related to competition issues is not directly covered by any 
international convention either at multilateral or bilateral level” (OECD, 2007: 
4). 
 Since the TCA could not gather evidence from some of the coal 
companies due to lack of their physical presence in Turkish territory, it tried to 
cooperate with the competition agencies of the firms’ home countries on the 
basis of its international agreements. Within this framework, the “TCA asked 
the European Commission and Competition Authority of Austria to take the 
necessary measures against these undertakings within their jurisdiction” by 
carrying out inspections and sending the gathered information and documents 
concerning Turkish market to the TCA (OECD, 2007: 5). Similarly, the TCA 
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made the same requests to Switzerland, based on the relevant articles of the 
free trade agreement between Turkey and EFTA states26.  
 The replies from the relevant parties were as follows: 
- European Commission informed that they could not share any 
information and documents about the firms and their activities with 
any country that is out of the scope of the jurisdiction of the 
European Commission due to principle of professional secrecy, 
- Austrian Federal Competition Authority officials replied that it 
would be better to handle the matter at Community level rather than 
at national level and 
- Competition Authority of Switzerland replied that spot inspections 
could be carried out when there were signs that anti-monopoly rules 
in Switzerland were violated. Therefore, they could not initiate any 
process against the firms that violated anti-monopoly rules in 
Turkey and permission of the relevant parties was necessary to send 
information and documents belonging to Swiss firms (OECD, 
2007).  
As a result, the investigation on sized coal market could only be carried 
on with those firms which have a contact point in Turkey and thus, only they 
were fined, although the other firms were probably a part of the cartel.  
                                                 
26 Article 17 of the EFTA agreement is about competition rules and prohibited activities restricting 
competition which affect trade between Turkey and Switzerland. Thus, it enables any party to take 
safeguard measures, if one party established any prohibited activities that were carried out in the 
jurisdiction of the other. Furthermore, first paragraph of Article 23 envisages consultation between the 
parties to solve the matter before applying any safeguard measures. 
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This case demonstrates, first of all, the limits of extraterritorial 
application of national laws: inability to hold inspections when the investigated 
firm does not have a contact point in Turkey. Moreover, even if the evidence is 
found by other ways, it may not be possible to satisfy the relevant procedural 
requests of the law: communication of official documents. Other than these, 
cooperation between the competition agencies on case-specific issues seems to 
be problematic, even though there are agreements and/or arrangements having 
cooperation, consultation and positive comity provisions between the parties.   
 
To sum up, as a member of the Customs Union and a candidate country 
for EU membership, Turkey takes the EU CLP as a reference and an anchor for 
its CLP.  Since competition policy is part of the acquis, Turkey is responsible 
to make its law and policy in line with the EU. The EU has approved Turkey’s 
high level of alignment in competition policy. Therefore, besides the factors of 
internationalization analyzed in the previous chapter, another important factor 
affected the Turkish CLP: EU conditionality. EU accession conditionality 
implies that EU membership is dependent on complying with the requirements 
of the EU. Economic criteria and acquis are the relevant conditions concerning 
the CLP. Hence it is seen in the Turkish case that exogenous pressure from the 
EU determined the change in Turkish policy on competition. Consequently, it 
seems that Turkish CLP attended the process of ‘Europeanization’ of CLP 
before the process of internationalization of CLP. 
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In the international arena, Turkey has other initiations in international 
organizations and with other countries. Yet, the provisions in these 
arrangements are not binding and have previously-mentioned shortcomings. 
Bilateral arrangements up to now were signed mostly with developing 
countries. To sum up, internationalization of Turkish CLP includes mostly 
coordination, experience exchange and technical assistance provisions.  
Concerning the factors of internationalization in Chapter 3, it is seen that 
globalization is an important factor in internationalization efforts of Turkey. 
Because with the internationalization of markets and liberalization of Turkish 
economy, foreign presence in Turkish markets increased and this created the 
problem of dealing with the anticompetitive activities conducted by foreign 
firms, which adversely affected the Turkish territory. Since extraterritorial 
application has its limits, TCA tried to cooperate with the EU and some other 
national agencies. Yet, no actual results were taken from those initiations.  
Role of non-state actors is limited in Turkish CLP both nationally and 
internationally. Due to short history of CLP in Turkey and lack of competition 
culture in the economy, awareness of CLP among, especially, national firms 
and business associations is low. Within the framework of “competition 
advocacy”, the TCA engages in several activities to increase awareness and to 
explain the competition rules to the private sector. For example, based on a 
protocol between the TCA and The Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (TUCCET), several conferences are held to introduce the 
general provisions of the TAPC to the members of the TUCCET. Yet, 
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heretofore, non-state actors have not been influential concerning the Turkish 
CLP.    
 
In this chapter, as the most successful supranationalization example, the 
EU’s CLP is analyzed. It is seen that the EU supranationalization process has 
considerable differences from the internationalization process of CLP in the 
world. Concerning the Turkish case, as Turkey being a candidate for the EU 
membership and a member of the Customs Union, Turkey’s CLP is also 
explained and Turkey’s place in the international antitrust field is discussed. 
In the next chapter, attempts and the factors of internationalization of 
CLP will be discussed by using the IPE theories. IPE theories are utilized to 
analyze and discuss the factors of internationalization of CLP within a different 
perspective so that we can better understand the internationalization process 
and gain a new insight. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1. Discussion on Theoretical Framework 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the internationalization of CLP and find 
out the factors that are important in the process of internationalization. Four main 
IPE theories are utilized to better understand the mechanisms and gain a new insight 
concerning the international CLP studies. 
 
 
6.1.1. Realism 
 
Unilateral application of national CLP to international business activities by 
the U.S. shows that rather than cooperating with other countries, the U.S. primarily 
prefers acting on its own in the international system of antitrust. Moreover, 
 114 
extraterritorial application of national laws also indicates that states care about their 
national interests instead of international ones.  
When the U.S., as the first and most experienced enforcer of antitrust law in 
the world, started to apply national antitrust laws to foreign jurisdictions and firms 
whose activities affect its own national territory, some other states gave reactions by 
applying blocking statues or some other diplomatic measures against the U.S. It is 
argued, for example, that “the British reaction to … US extraterritorial enforcement 
illustrates that the issue does rise to the level of power politics” (Fidler, 1992: 574).  
According to the realist IPE, states feel a threat to their national sovereignty when 
other countries apply their policies in their territories and thus, they take action to 
pursue their own power and interests.  
Exemptions given to export cartels can be given as an example of how states 
protect their own industries and, thus, pursue national interests against foreign rivals. 
“These export cartel provisions remind one of the realist tenets that economic power 
is political power in the international system” (Fidler, 1992: 572). Moreover, some 
decisions taken by domestic competition authorities are also seen as political rather 
than economic decisions, in which the state protects its own industry or firms against 
foreign ones. Such decisions are also regarded as attempts to control foreign firms’ 
power in domestic economies.  
In a study that analyzed the “government reaction to large corporate merger 
attempts” in the EU between 1997 and 2006, authors argue that the nationality of the 
acquiring company is an important factor in decision-making of the governments 
(Dinç and Erel, 2009). By using primary data for the merger attempts in the first 
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fifteen EU member countries during 1997-2006, they conclude that reactions of some 
governments to merger attempts are non-economic and do not have to do with 
competitive concerns. Instead, it is found in this econometric study that economic 
nationalism(Dinç and Erel, 2009).  
Overall, realists argue that the “multitude of interests leads to conflicting 
views on the necessity of [an international] agreement” on CLP (Ezrachi, 2005: 6). In 
fact, realists would argue that “market relations are shaped by political power” and 
“economic policy should be used to build a more powerful [and wealthy] state” 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 15). 
Although unilateral enforcement of domestic competition laws to protect 
national interests and also confliction of national interests can be explained by realist 
IPE, the existence of cooperation and convergence efforts in CLP seem to be refuting 
the realist assumption that interactions in IPE is zero-sum game. Therefore, it is seen 
that the persistent influence and power of states in the process of internationalization 
of CLP seem to be valid with certain limitations.  
 On the other hand, the EU’s support for a binding international antitrust 
regime under the auspices of the WTO in 1990s and supranationalization of EU CLP, 
which was analyzed in Chapter five, seems to be undermining certain realist 
arguments.  
Although realist IPE can explain the supranationalization of CLP up to some 
level, it has certain limitations on explaining the role of non-state actors such as 
MNCs and supranational institutions. Moreover, it seems that the 
supranationalization of CLP is in accordance with the economic integration of the 
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EU. Yet, realism cannot provide sufficient explanations on such a ‘spillover’ effect 
between the issue areas.  
 
 
6.1.2. Liberalism 
 
The existence of national CLPs itself has to do with one of the core 
arguments of the liberal theory that the role of the state should be preventing 
restraints on competition and thereby creating an open environment where world’s 
scarce resources can be used efficiently (Cohn, 2005: 91). Wilks and Bartle (2002: 
157) argue that “[j]ust as independent courts symbolize the rule of law, so a 
competition agency symbolizes commitment to the free market”. 
In the same token, for liberals, state and non-state actors cooperate and 
domestic laws and policies converge in the field of CLP because by reducing 
potential frictions, states gain from interdependence and cooperation in this field. 
Moreover, it is argued by the liberals that “international agreements or regimes 
would maintain international economic order” (Keohane, 1984 in O’Brien and 
Williams, 2007: 20). For instance, although UNCTAD has non-binding rules and 
recommendations in competition policy area, it helps developing states gain 
assistance for implementing competition law. Developed states, on the other hand, 
have the possibility to broaden the area of their CLP systems by shaping the agenda 
and providing technical assistance to developing countries. Thus, liberals would 
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argue that UNCTAD serves as a platform to increase gains from interdependence and 
convergence.  
Bilateral arrangements between countries that include negative and/or 
positive comity provisions, exchange of information or dual investigation processes 
are examples of increasing interdependence and resulting cooperation in the system. 
These states cooperate with each other in specific cases or situations in which, in the 
absence of bilateral arrangements, there could exist conflicts between them. 
Notification (to each other) as a “first step to cooperation” increased significantly in 
recent years: in the period 1976-1979 there were 37 notifications on average between 
the OECD countries (bilaterally), 106 in the period 1980-1985 and 220 in the period 
1990-1991 (Zanettin, 2002: 78). Zanettin (2002:78) argues that “[s]uch an evolution 
may show a greater commitment to cooperation”. 
Although some major states apply their competition laws extraterritorially, it 
is seen that because of increasing conflicts among states there existed a ‘more 
sensitive doctrine’ on extraterritorial enforcement and countries started to cooperate 
in order to decrease the concerns over national sovereignty. Bilateral, regional and/or 
multilateral efforts for cooperation and convergence are indicators of the situation.  
For instance, in the cooperation agreement between the U.S. and the EU, it is 
stated that the parties will notify each other if they realize that their enforcement 
activities may affect important interests of the other party. This process is in line with 
the liberal argumentation that states cooperate in order to handle the conflict 
situations or problems in the international competition law system and gain mutually 
from cooperation. “This diplomatic activity demonstrates that States that value 
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economic interdependence do not engage one another in the international system on 
strictly realist terms” (Fidler, 1992: 577).  
Keohane and Nye (1977:33-35) argue that multiple channels of interaction 
between governments and societies in different territories is one of the factors that 
create complex interdependence, which “blurs the distinction between domestic and 
international”. The interaction of non-state actors such as MNCs, business 
organizations, international organizations constitute transnational networks. It is 
argued that “contacts between governmental bureaucracies that have similar missions 
may not only alter their perspectives but lead to transgovernmental coalitions on 
particular policy questions” (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 34). Furthermore, such 
interactions and communications are thought to have the potential to cause change in 
the perceptions of a state’s self-interest; transgovernmental politics may hinder states 
to pursue clearly specified goals. (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 35, 115). 
Within this framework, Slaughter (2004:39) examines the networking of 
regulators around the world since she argues that “[b]usineses that cross borders 
must be regulated across borders” and hence there is a need for cooperation among 
regulators. Raustiala (2002), on the other hand, argues that transgovernmental 
cooperation increases liberal internationalism since they fill a gap between non-
cooperation and cooperation based on treaties/agreements. According to this 
transgovernmentalist theory, there are other actors in the system than the state but 
this does not mean the state is disappearing; instead it disaggregates according to the 
purposes of cooperation (Raustiala, 2002: 10-11, Slaughter, 2004: 5).  
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In fact, international CLP is a policy field in which transgovernmental 
networks are actively functioning. Bilateral arrangements between jurisdictions, 
informal international interactions, efforts under the OECD, UNCTAD and the ICN 
are all examples of transgovernmental/transnational networking in which usually the 
bureaucrats and regulators from competition agencies interact with each other. 
According to liberalism, transgovernmentalism in particular, these networks both 
facilitate cooperation among regulators and shape domestic regulation of antitrust 
around the world (convergence) (Raustiala, 2002:91).  
For example, the ICN was established as a ‘network’ of domestic competition 
agencies and also of non-state actors. The goals of the ICN clearly support the 
normative aspects of transgovernmental theory. The ICN is seen as a setting where 
cooperation and convergence between developed and developing countries shall 
mutually benefit both sides (Raustiala, 2002: 43). 
Moreover, the development of the ICN is seen by the liberals as an example 
of how, as Nye (2004: 5) argues, soft power gets “others to want the outcomes that 
[one] wants” by “co-opt[ing] rather than coerc[ing] them”. The soft power of the 
ICN lies in peer pressure among members, technical assistance, advocacy and 
support of the non-governmental bodies that cause members to adopt non-binding 
best practices and recommendations of the ICN. “The ICN is a soft-law formation, 
and soft law has a tendency to become hard law” (Fox, 2009:174). 
Overall, cooperation and convergence that occur between governments and/or 
competition agencies that is described here show that states voluntarily cooperate to 
alleviate the problems caused by application of national laws on international 
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antitrust problems. Thus, these efforts to decrease conflicts in the international 
competition law system through such arrangements coincide with the liberal 
theoretical perspective that formal and informal communication and interaction 
among nation-states; international organizations, transnational and 
transgovernmental networks etc. have the ability to alleviate the potential for conflict 
between states and lead to cooperation.  
 
 
6.1.3. Historical Structuralism 
 
Incorporating CLP into the state policy-making is itself a part of the 
neoliberal agenda because regulating the failures of the free market economy has the 
aim of maintaining the capitalist system thoroughly.  Hence, CLP seems to be 
inseparable with capitalism and liberal ideas. The aims and goals of competition law 
were drawn by major powers mainly by the U.S. and then spread to jurisdictions 
such as Canada, Japan, Germany and the EU. Although there are significant 
differences in competition law systems even across developed countries, the main 
goal and the basic tenets reflect the consent of subordinate groups. Thus, the ‘general 
system of competition law’ has been legitimized through transnational historical 
blocs across other countries including the developing, even the least developed ones. 
For example, of the 93 ICN member countries, only 30 of them are classified as 
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“advanced economy” according to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database27. 
Concerning the UNCTAD classification, 32 of the ICN member countries are 
“developed”28. Thus, it could be argued that nearly 60% of the ICN members are 
from the developing (or even least developed such as Zambia, Yemen, Tanzania and 
Senegal) world that have the consent to have CLP system. 
For instance, the ICN and its official goals reflect how the major powers 
export and diffuse their CLP systems. In such a setting, developing countries give 
their consent to this liberal agenda although it may not be appropriate for their 
economic systems. The claim of Fox (2009: 171) that although developed countries 
have more say on the ICN than developing world, the leaders try to “include, involve 
and respond to all voices” is understood by historical structuralists as the existence of 
inequality and creation of  a common competition culture by developed world to 
legitimize their power. 
Similarly, in the case of Turkey, it accepted to introduce a competition law 
and an independent competition authority after the negotiations and then agreement 
on the Customs Union with the EU although it may undermine its domestic firms’ 
profits or citizens’ welfare.  
Consequently, the argument of historical structuralism that the market 
relations in the capitalist system create injustice and inequality can be considered for 
the competition law system. For example, the inclusion of CLP to UNCTAD’s 
agenda can be considered as an effort to change competition law system into a more 
egalitarian and non-liberal one. As a part of New International Economic Order 
                                                 
27 Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/groups.htm#ae  
28 Available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdscsir20071_en.pdf  
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(NEIO) efforts, developing countries wanted to use CLP for their development 
purposes. The reason for the efforts was that developing countries perceived that 
“capitalist notions of ‘competition’ between private undertakings in reality worked as 
a mechanism of power politics used to weaken the abilities of some states to 
challenge the status quo” (Fidler, 1992: 581).  
In historical structuralism, both CLP system itself and process 
internationalization of CLP are seen as ways to legitimize the power of developed 
world through creation of a common competition culture. Nevertheless, historical 
structuralist theory has limitations on explaining why and how there are different 
levels of internationalization of CLP.   
 
 
6.1.4. Constructivism  
 
Concerning the CLP and internationalization process of CLP, there are no 
sufficient studies and/or findings to be utilized by constructivist IPE perspective. 
Nevertheless, the explanations of constructivism on economic world and 
international economy can be applied to CLP. For example, constructivists claim that 
economic policies are socially constructed and there are norms legitimized by the 
interaction of markets, governments and societies (Abdelal et al., 2005: 25-27). 
Consequently, it could be argued that expectations and beliefs about antitrust 
law and policy shape this policy field and the norms and values constituted by 
antitrust law and policy shape the beliefs and interests of actors in the process. 
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Similarly, norms and values in internationalization process of CLP are socially 
constructed by the interactions of governments with each other and governments 
with markets. Furthermore, these norms, values and changes in them alter the 
interests and expectations of actors (states, regulators etc.) in the internationalization 
process. 
Within this framework, the interactions between competition authorities and 
norms/rules of international organizations shape those actors’ expectations and 
preferences on internationalization of CLP. Furthermore, actors’ beliefs and 
expectations also shape the internationalization process and outcome of CLP. 
Therefore, internationalization of CLP is seen by constructivists as a social 
construction in both its causes and effects.  
For example, interaction between competition authorities and expectations on 
international antitrust (increasing cooperation and expanding CLP throughout the 
world for major states, technical assistance for new jurisdictions) shaped the 
objectives of the ICN. The work of the ICN and intersubjective knowledge created 
by its members constituted the norms and values for internationalization of CLP: 
State sovereignties are of primary importance and an international agreement on 
antitrust has no relevance in the ICN context. Furthermore, these norms and values 
shape the internationalization process as well as the expectations and preferences of 
agents. Therefore, the decreasing emphasis on an international agreement and/or 
supranationalization (compared to 1990s) and increasing importance of the ICN can 
be seen as a result of the intersubjective knowledge created in the ICN context.   
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6.1.5. Conclusion on IPE Theoretical Perspectives 
  
 In the light of these findings, it should be noted that the process of 
internationalization of CLP is complex. There are various important factors shaping 
internationalization process. Therefore, different degrees, levels and forms of 
internationalization can be explained by different theories.  
Yet, taking into account the current state of internationalization of CLP, it 
seems that neoliberal institutionalism gives the most plausible explanation. Although 
CLP is a field in which sovereignty concerns and domestic interests matter, there is 
cooperation and convergence at some level such as the initiations of international 
organizations like the OECD and the ICN together with bilateral arrangements 
between competition agencies.  Countries take part in such institutions in which they 
think there is a potential for cooperation and hence they will have potential or actual 
gains from cooperation. In line with Guzman’s argument (2001), it seems that states 
prefer cooperating with each other as long as it protects their interests and provide 
them struggle with the problems of international business conduct in domestic 
markets.  
 When the existing mechanisms of internationalization of CLP are analyzed, 
there are: 
- International organizations (OECD, the UNCTAD and the ICN) that 
mostly prepare recommendations/best practices and provide technical 
assistance/advocacy to national competition agencies and hence, aim 
at increasing cooperation and convergence in CLP, 
 125 
- Bilateral and regional cooperation arrangements that include 
notification, information exchange and consultation requirements, 
also negative and positive comity provisions, which are voluntary in 
nature, 
- Regional trade agreements that include general competition 
provisions. 
Thus, in the light of the neoliberal institutionalist arguments formal and 
informal rules/institutions also have a role in the international system. The existence 
of international institutions “facilitate self-interested cooperation by reducing 
uncertainty” (Kayıhan, 2003: 16) as demonstrated in the case of the 
internationalization of CLP process. 
It is seen that most of the current modes of internationalization are non-
binding and voluntary in nature and they aim at facilitating international cooperation 
and increasing convergence on CLP. On the other hand, previous attempts to create 
binding competition rules or propositions for harmonization and supranationalization 
were never realized. Rather, current regimes and institutions facilitate cooperation to 
secure national interests. Existence of different institutions and actors in the process 
is also in line with the neoliberal institutionalist argument that other than primary 
role of states, there are actors such as international organizations, 
bilateral/multilateral arrangements etc. 
As the major economies of the world that have the ability to shape and 
manage the global economy, the EU and the U.S. also have the most sophisticated 
CLP systems. There have been conflicts between two countries on certain antitrust 
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cases. This is because of the differences in their jurisdictions and more importantly 
because they have a tendency to protect their domestic firms and economies. On the 
other hand, they also cooperate in various cases and under different settings. Bilateral 
agreement between these two countries include provisions on exchange of 
information, positive comity etc. Hence, various potential conflicts are resolved by 
formal and informal interactions between two jurisdictions. 
Concerning the effect of international institutions on state policy, neobileral 
institutionalism argues that “they affect domestic policy by changing conceptions of 
interest, and thus the policies of the governments” (Kayıhan, 2003: 16). It is seen in 
the process of internationalization of CLP that existing institutions for cooperation 
and convergence aim at increasing communication and mutual understanding and 
create common rules and norms. Rather than threatening state interests through hard 
forms of internationalization, these institutions try to create a competition culture 
around the world, which will affect the state interests and perceptions in the future. 
Consequently, it is argued that neoliberal institutionalism gives the most 
plausible explanation on the process of internationalization of CLP.  
 
 
6.2. Conclusion of the Thesis 
 
One of the major developments of the twentieth century (especially last two 
or three decades) has been the acceleration in the process of globalization, which 
increased the amount of international anticompetitive business activities. Hence, 
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CLP, which was once a national-only policy field, had to deal with business conduct 
having an international dimension. Antitrust regulators found themselves in a 
position dealing with cases that involve firms and evidence located in foreign 
jurisdictions. As a response, countries/regulators (especially the U.S.) started to 
apply their domestic laws and policies extraterritorially to protect competition in 
domestic markets. 
Extraterritorial application of domestic laws and policies cause conflicts 
between jurisdictions because it deranges the legal, economic and political interests 
of other countries. It can be anticipated easily that no sovereign state prefers another 
states’ law and policy to be applied to activities that take place on its own territory. 
Hence, different forms of internationalization of CLP appear to be the attempts to 
overcome the hurdles created by international anticompetitive business conduct and 
extraterritorial application of domestic policies. When previous and current efforts of 
internationalization are analyzed, it is seen that there have been various actors and 
modes in the process of internationalization of CLP, ranging from cooperation and 
coordination arrangements to initiations for a binding international antitrust code. 
Today, international organizations such as the OECD, the UNCTAD and the 
ICN include international CLP issues on their agendas and mostly, they publish 
recommendations and best practices to increase cooperation and convergence. 
Moreover, they provide technical assistance especially to countries that recently 
introduced national CLPs. Bilateral arrangements, on the other hand, are the other 
most extensive form of internationalization of CLP. Introduced as a mechanism to 
alleviate the conflicts caused by extraterritoriality, today, bilateral agreements 
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contain certain cooperation provisions such as notification, information exchange, 
comity principles etc. These arrangements are also non-binding and voluntary most 
of the time. Moreover, parties to such arrangements are usually developed countries 
that have close trade relationships and share similar antitrust policies/objectives.  
Although various cooperation and convergence mechanisms were introduced 
under different settings, no consensus could be reached on conclusion of a binding 
international antitrust agreement and/or on introduction of a supranational antitrust 
institution. The most known failed attempt for a binding antitrust regime was 
initiated under the auspices of the WTO. The aim of providing a ground for 
negotiations on internationally binding minimum standard for competition rules was 
dropped from the agenda since some countries (mainly from the U.S. and the 
developing world) opposed it. 
Within this framework, it was demonstrated that differences between 
countries are important in the sense that they determine the form and level of 
internationalization of CLP. Countries do not prefer binding regimes, when there are 
differences especially between development and integration levels and competition 
policies/institutional cultures. Another factor that is important in the process is the 
relationship between the EU and the U.S. The differences between two countries 
CLP models, their differing views on internationalization of CLP and competition 
between these jurisdictions concerning the expansion of their CLP regimes to other 
countries affect the process of internationalization.  
The EU CLP was analyzed in this thesis as an example of successful 
internationalization of CLP. It has been concluded that the EU has different 
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dynamics that led to the supranationalization of its CLP and it cannot be a model for 
the worldwide internationalization of CLP. Turkish CLP, on the other hand, was 
explained because Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership and also has 
close trade relationships with the EU. Moreover, as a developing country with a short 
period of CLP history, Turkey’s place in the internationalization process was 
analyzed. It is seen that EU membership conditionality has been the primary factor 
affecting the Turkish CLP. 
In the light of the findings, four main IPE theoretical perspectives are 
discussed to explain the process of internationalization of CLP. Because it is thought 
that an account of IPE provides a new insight and a further understanding for the 
internationalization mechanism and the role of various actors-states, regulators, 
international organizations, firms.  
Within this framework, it is argued that neoliberal institutionalism provides 
the most plausible explanation for internationalization of CLP. It is shown that 
countries/regulators do not prefer being legally bound by certain agreements or 
supranational institutions because they do not favor surrendering their power. Yet, 
they engage in several cooperation and convergence arrangements under different 
institutional settings as long as their domestic interests are protected. Furthermore, 
the nation states can gain from these arrangements. Similarly, existing non-
binding/voluntary cooperation and convergence mechanisms demonstrate that states 
prefer internationalization of CLP up to a level that does not interfere with their 
sovereignties and interests but at the same time help them to overcome the problems 
created by internationalization of CLP. 
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In the light of the above-mentioned findings, it is thought that rather than 
binding international arrangements and/or harmonization/supranationalization of 
CLP, existing cooperation and convergence mechanisms will prevail in the future. 
The role of the ICN deserves a special attention because; it is the only transnational 
network that has a competition-only agenda. Its emphasis on respect for national 
sovereignties and absence of a binding agreement in its agenda, positioning itself as a 
soft law organization that aims at increasing cooperation and convergence by issuing 
non-binding recommendations and best practices and also having governmental 
members (regulators) from all around the world (developed and developing) as well 
as non-governmental members; the ICN seems as a very important organization for 
the future international system of CLP. As Fox (2009: 174) mentions, the ICN “fills 
a real need in global antitrust”, a field in which there are domestic laws and policies 
that apply to “conduct in global markets and yet resist internationalization”.  
In sum, there are various factors that affect internationalization of CLP and 
the current state of the process demonstrate that form and level of 
internationalization has been limited to certain cooperation and convergence 
mechanisms. It is thought that agreeing on a binding international antitrust code or 
supranationalization of CLP does not seem possible in the near future because states 
continue cooperating as long as it  protects their domestic interests and enables them 
to have positive gains.  While differences between countries are not likely to 
disappear,. It is perceived that existing mechanisms may provide convergence of 
national laws and policies, no matter the speed of convergence (soft/bottom-up 
convergence) has been a slow. Consequently, analysis of the important factors shows 
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that internationalization of CLP is likely to cover cooperation and convergence 
mechanisms under different bilateral and multilateral settings, at least in the short 
and medium term. These efforts are valuable in the sense that they increase 
communication and mutual understanding of CLP and, although slowly, facilitate 
convergence of antitrust rules towards a future international antitrust system.  
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